Quoting Amir Goldstein (amir73il at gmail.com):

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 6:01 PM, Serge E. Hallyn [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

Quoting Eddie.Horng (eddie.horng at mediatek.com):

quoted

The code in cap_inode_getsecurity(), introduced by commit 8db6c34f1dbc
("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities"), should use
d_find_any_alias()
instead of d_find_alias() do handle unhashed dentry correctly. This is
needed,
for example, if execveat() is called with an open but unlinked overlayfs
file, because overlayfs unhashes dentry on unlink.

Below reproducer and setup can reproduce the case.
  const char* exec="echo";
  const char *newargv[] = { "echo", "hello", NULL};
  const char *newenviron[] = { NULL };
  int fd, err;

  fd = open(exec, O_PATH);
  unlink(exec);
  err = syscall(322/*SYS_execveat*/, fd, "", newargv, newenviron,
AT_EMPTY_PATH);
  if(err<0)
    fprintf(stderr, "execveat: %s\n", strerror(errno));

gcc compile into ~/test/a.out
mount -t overlay -orw,lowerdir=/mnt/l,upperdir=/mnt/u,workdir=/mnt/w
none /mnt/m
cd /mnt/m
cp /bin/echo .
~/test/a.out

Expected result:
hello
Actually result:
execveat: Invalid argument
dmesg:
Invalid argument reading file caps for /dev/fd/3

Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")

Did 8db6c34f1dbc actually introduce a regression?

Yes, it did. The regression was reported to the overlayfs list:
https://marc.info/?l=linux-unionfs&m=152940239421174&w=2

I directed Eddie toward this simple reproducer, but problem
was observed in real life environment.

I realize now that the information about the original regression
is missing from the commit message.
Eddie you may add a link to the mailing list thread in your
commit message, but please do mention the nature of the
regression you reported is a real life application.

Ah, thanks.  I misunderstood, and thought that it was just a case
of namespaced file capabilities not working.

quoted

Note this does seem to potentially introduce an attack where a
user fetches an open fd to any file with filecaps, waits for a
CVE publication, then after the admin has updated the package
causing the file to be deleted, then does execveat to run the
deleted package with privs.

Without arguing what the expected behavior should be (I believe

Yes, I avoided mentioning that in my first email because I kept
waffling.  It seems like requiring a package manager that cares
to clear the fscaps (maybe just chowning to clear all suid/etc)
is the right thing.  On the other hand demanding extra work from
pre-existing users for a new features is wrong.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

execveat is meant to prevent to exact opposite attack), the change
in this patch does NOT change behavior for ext4 and probably
other local file systems. It *only* changes behavior for overlayfs

Hm, I'll have to take your word for it - following the code in
vfs_unlink() seems to suggest it's immediately unhashed, and the
ext4 orphan list only holds the inode without any hashed dentries.
But I'm probably mis-reading.

and possibly other networking file systems that unhash the dentry
on unlink.

So the attack vector you are referring to exists in current code
as well for local file systems.

Thanks,
Amir.

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