diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 7161d8e7ee79..517dea60b87b 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1385,6 +1385,19 @@
* @bpf_prog_free_security:
* Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog.
*
+ * @bpf_map_file:
+ * When creating a bpf map fd, set up the file security information with
+ * the bpf security information stored in the map struct. So when the map
+ * fd is passed between processes, the security module can directly read
+ * the security information from file security struct rather than the bpf
+ * security struct.
+ *
+ * @bpf_prog_file:
+ * When creating a bpf prog fd, set up the file security information with
+ * the bpf security information stored in the prog struct. So when the prog
+ * fd is passed between processes, the security module can directly read
+ * the security information from file security struct rather than the bpf
+ * security struct.
*/
union security_list_options {
int (*binder_set_context_mgr)(struct task_struct *mgr);@@ -1726,6 +1739,8 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*bpf_map_free_security)(struct bpf_map *map);
int (*bpf_prog_alloc_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
+ void (*bpf_map_file)(struct bpf_map *map, struct file *file);
+ void (*bpf_prog_file)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux, struct file *file);
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
};
@@ -1954,6 +1969,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct list_head bpf_map_free_security;
struct list_head bpf_prog_alloc_security;
struct list_head bpf_prog_free_security;
+ struct list_head bpf_map_file;
+ struct list_head bpf_prog_file;
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
} __randomize_layout;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 18800b0911e5..57573b794e2d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ extern int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map);
extern void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map);
extern int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
extern void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
+extern void security_bpf_map_file(struct bpf_map *map, struct file *file);
+extern void security_bpf_prog_file(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux, struct file *file);
#else
static inline int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
unsigned int size)
@@ -1772,6 +1774,13 @@ static inline int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
static inline void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
{ }
+
+static inline void security_bpf_map_file(struct bpf_map *map, struct file *file)
+{ }
+
+static inline void security_bpf_prog_file(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux,
+ struct file *file)
+{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 1cf31ddd7616..aee69e564c50 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -324,11 +324,22 @@ static const struct file_operations bpf_map_fops = {
int bpf_map_new_fd(struct bpf_map *map, int flags)
{
+ int fd;
+ struct fd f;
if (security_bpf_map(map, OPEN_FMODE(flags)))
return -EPERM;
- return anon_inode_getfd("bpf-map", &bpf_map_fops, map,
+ fd = anon_inode_getfd("bpf-map", &bpf_map_fops, map,
flags | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return fd;
+
+ f = fdget(fd);
+ if (!f.file)
+ return -EBADF;
+ security_bpf_map_file(map, f.file);
+ fdput(f);
+ return fd;
}
int bpf_get_file_flag(int flags)@@ -975,11 +986,23 @@ static const struct file_operations bpf_prog_fops = {
int bpf_prog_new_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
+ int fd;
+ struct fd f;
+
if (security_bpf_prog(prog))
return -EPERM;
- return anon_inode_getfd("bpf-prog", &bpf_prog_fops, prog,
+ fd = anon_inode_getfd("bpf-prog", &bpf_prog_fops, prog,
O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return fd;
+
+ f = fdget(fd);
+ if (!f.file)
+ return -EBADF;
+ security_bpf_prog_file(prog->aux, f.file);
+ fdput(f);
+ return fd;
}
static struct bpf_prog *____bpf_prog_get(struct fd f)diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1cd8526cb0b7..dacf649b8cfa 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1734,4 +1734,12 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
{
call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux);
}
+void security_bpf_map_file(struct bpf_map *map, struct file *file)
+{
+ call_void_hook(bpf_map_file, map, file);
+}
+void security_bpf_prog_file(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux, struct file *file)
+{
+ call_void_hook(bpf_prog_file, aux, file);
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 94e473b9c884..0a6ef20513b0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1815,6 +1815,10 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+static int bpf_file_check(struct file *file, u32 sid);
+#endif
+
/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to@@ -1845,6 +1849,14 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
goto out;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ if (fsec->bpf_type) {
+ rc = bpf_file_check(file, cred_sid(cred));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+#endif
+
/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
rc = 0;
if (av)@@ -2165,6 +2177,14 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
return rc;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ if (fsec->bpf_type) {
+ rc = bpf_file_check(file, sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+#endif
+
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
@@ -6288,6 +6308,33 @@ static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
return av;
}
+/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
+ * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
+ * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
+ * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
+ * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
+ * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
+ * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
+ */
+static int bpf_file_check(struct file *file, u32 sid)
+{
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (fsec->bpf_type == BPF_MAP) {
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->bpf_sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ } else if (fsec->bpf_type == BPF_PROG) {
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->bpf_sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ BPF__PROG_USE, NULL);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
{
u32 sid = current_sid();@@ -6351,6 +6398,24 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
aux->security = NULL;
kfree(bpfsec);
}
+
+static void selinux_bpf_map_file(struct bpf_map *map, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+
+ fsec->bpf_type = BPF_MAP;
+ fsec->bpf_sid = bpfsec->sid;
+}
+
+static void selinux_bpf_prog_file(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+
+ fsec->bpf_type = BPF_PROG;
+ fsec->bpf_sid = bpfsec->sid;
+}
#endif
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {@@ -6581,6 +6646,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_file, selinux_bpf_map_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_file, selinux_bpf_prog_file),
#endif
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 3d54468ce334..0162648761f9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -67,11 +67,20 @@ struct inode_security_struct {
spinlock_t lock;
};
+enum bpf_obj_type {
+ BPF_MAP = 1,
+ BPF_PROG,
+};
+
struct file_security_struct {
u32 sid; /* SID of open file description */
u32 fown_sid; /* SID of file owner (for SIGIO) */
u32 isid; /* SID of inode at the time of file open */
u32 pseqno; /* Policy seqno at the time of file open */
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ unsigned char bpf_type;
+ u32 bpf_sid;
+#endif
};
struct superblock_security_struct {--
2.14.2.920.gcf0c67979c-goog
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