[PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
From: Mimi Zohar <hidden>
Date: 2017-04-07 03:49:33
Also in:
kexec, linux-efi, lkml
On Fri, 2017-04-07 at 11:05 +0800, Dave Young wrote:
On 04/05/17 at 09:15pm, David Howells wrote:quoted
From: Chun-Yi Lee <redacted> When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not loads image through kexec_file systemcall if securelevel has been set. This code was showed in Matthew's patch but not in git: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/13/778 Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: kexec at lists.infradead.org --- kernel/kexec_file.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c index b118735fea9d..f6937eecd1eb 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c@@ -268,6 +268,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd, if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) return -EPERM; + /* Don't permit images to be loaded into trusted kernels if we're not + * going to verify the signature on them + */ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG) && kernel_is_locked_down()) + return -EPERM; +
IMA can be used to verify file signatures too, based on the LSM hooks in ?kernel_read_file_from_fd(). ?CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG should not be required. Mimi
/* Make sure we have a legal set of flags */quoted
if (flags != (flags & KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS)) return -EINVAL; _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec at lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexecAcked-by: Dave Young <redacted> Thanks Dave -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
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