[PATCH v3] security/Kconfig: further restrict HARDENED_USERCOPY
From: Kees Cook <hidden>
Date: 2017-03-09 21:31:13
Also in:
lkml
On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 1:19 PM, Tycho Andersen [off-list ref] wrote:
It doesn't make sense to have HARDENED_USERCOPY when either /dev/kmem is
enabled or /dev/mem can be used to read kernel memory (i.e.
!STRICT_DEVMEM).
v2: add !MMU depend as well
v3: drop !MMU, s/ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED/DEVMEM, which makes the above
commit message actually match the logic again
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <redacted>
CC: Kees Cook <redacted>
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
CC: James Morris <redacted>Awesome, thanks! I'll add this to the usercopy tree. -Kees
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
--- security/Kconfig | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 3ff1bf9..4619cee 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig@@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR + depends on !DEVKMEM + depends on !DEVMEM || STRICT_DEVMEM select BUG help This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when --2.7.4
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