[PATCH] security/Kconfig: further restrict HARDENED_USERCOPY
flat view
STALE3508d
From: Tycho Andersen <hidden>
Date: 2017-03-09 17:31:48
Also in:
lkml
Subsystem:
security subsystem, the rest · Maintainers:
Paul Moore, James Morris, "Serge E. Hallyn", Linus Torvalds
It doesn't make sense to have HARDENED_USERCOPY when either /dev/kmem is enabled or /dev/mem can be used to read kernel memory. v2: add !MMU depend as well Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <redacted> CC: Kees Cook <redacted> CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> CC: James Morris <redacted> --- security/Kconfig | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 3ff1bf9..aeabd40 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig@@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR + depends on !DEVKMEM + depends on !ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED || STRICT_DEVMEM || !MMU select BUG help This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
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2.7.4
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