Re: Trust model for raw QPs

On 15/08/2012 17:06, Christoph Lameter wrote:

On Wed, 15 Aug 2012, Or Gerlitz wrote:

quoted

Currently, for an app to open a raw QP from user space, we (verbs) require
admin permission, for which we (Mellanox) got customer feedback saying this is
problematic on some of the environments.

Well yes it is but the kernel mod is a one line to get rid of this problem.

Its one LOC that has behind it many lines  of reasoning... e.g as 
specified in the change-log, those QP are to some extent the RDMA stack 
form of packet/raw sockets.

quoted

Suppose we allow to user to provide source mac+vlan when creating the QP or when modifying its state, and the HW can enforce that -- in that case I think its OK to remove that restriction e.g ala what is allowed today with user space UD QPs when the fabric is IB.

Well yes that would mean that the source mac and vlan are configured with
admin permissions and then the app would run without within the
constraints established in priviledged moded.

There a co-existence between the IP stack and the RDMA stack, which is 
for example exercised by the RDMA-CM design, here also, the admin 
configured a MAC and VLAN for a netdevice that is bounded to a HW 
NIC/port we want to create RAW QP on, and there's a non privileged user 
space app that want to  generate frames with this mac/vlan, and we say 
its allowed once the HW can enforce that.

Or.


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