Re: Trust model for raw QPs

On 15/08/2012 16:40, Steve Wise wrote:

On 8/15/2012 8:28 AM, Or Gerlitz wrote:

quoted

Currently, for an app to open a raw QP from user space, we (verbs) 
require admin permission, for which we (Mellanox) got customer 
feedback saying this is problematic on some of the environments.

Suppose we allow to user to provide source mac+vlan when creating the 
QP or when modifying its state, and the HW can enforce that -- in 
that case I think its OK to remove that restriction e.g ala what is 
allowed today with user space UD QPs when the fabric is IB.

We have similar requirements from customers.   I don't understand how 
mac+vlan allows the driver to enforce anything?  Can you explain this 
further?

Its what's  called HW anti spoofing support, very common in the 
virtualization world when you want te HW to enforce source mac/vlan for 
Ethernet frames sent by a VM using an SRIOV VF -- user-space is a 
private case of that very same problem. Its not driver enforcement, its 
driver advertizing the ability of the HW to enforce.

Or.

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