On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 4:58 PM Rob Herring [off-list ref] wrote:

On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 10:27 AM Will Deacon [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

On Fri, Aug 06, 2021 at 04:51:22PM -0600, Rob Herring wrote:

quoted

Arm PMUs can support direct userspace access of counters which allows for
low overhead (i.e. no syscall) self-monitoring of tasks. The same feature
exists on x86 called 'rdpmc'. Unlike x86, userspace access will only be
enabled for thread bound events. This could be extended if needed, but
simplifies the implementation and reduces the chances for any
information leaks (which the x86 implementation suffers from).

When an event is capable of userspace access and has been mmapped, userspace
access is enabled when the event is scheduled on a CPU's PMU. There's some
additional overhead clearing counters when disabled in order to prevent
leaking disabled counter data from other tasks.

Unlike x86, enabling of userspace access must be requested with a new
attr bit: config1:1. If the user requests userspace access and 64-bit
counters, then chaining will be disabled and the user will get the
maximum size counter the underlying h/w can support. The modes for
config1 are as follows:

config1 = 0 : user access disabled and always 32-bit
config1 = 1 : user access disabled and always 64-bit (using chaining if needed)
config1 = 2 : user access enabled and always 32-bit
config1 = 3 : user access enabled and counter size matches underlying counter.

Based on work by Raphael Gault [off-list ref], but has been
completely re-written.

Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <redacted>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>

---
v9:
 - Enabling/disabling of user access is now controlled in .start() and
   mmap hooks which are now called on CPUs that the event is on.
   Depends on rework of perf core and x86 RDPMC code posted here:
   https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210728230230.1911468-1-robh@kernel.org/ (local)

v8:
 - Rework user access tracking and enabling to be done on task
   context changes using sched_task() hook. This avoids the need for any
   IPIs, mm_switch hooks or undef instr handler.
 - Only support user access when explicitly requested on open and
   only for a thread bound events. This avoids some of the information
   leaks x86 has and simplifies the implementation.

v7:
 - Clear disabled counters when user access is enabled for a task to
   avoid leaking other tasks counter data.
 - Rework context switch handling utilizing sched_task callback
 - Add armv8pmu_event_can_chain() helper
 - Rework config1 flags handling structure
 - Use ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER_USER define for remapped user cycle
   counter index

v6:
 - Add new attr.config1 rdpmc bit for userspace to hint it wants
   userspace access when also requesting 64-bit counters.

v5:
 - Only set cap_user_rdpmc if event is on current cpu
 - Limit enabling/disabling access to CPUs associated with the PMU
   (supported_cpus) and with the mm_struct matching current->active_mm.

v2:
 - Move mapped/unmapped into arm64 code. Fixes arm32.
 - Rebase on cap_user_time_short changes

Changes from Raphael's v4:
  - Drop homogeneous check
  - Disable access for chained counters
  - Set pmc_width in user page
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h   |   6 ++
 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c
index 74f77b68f5f0..66d8bf62e99c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c

@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ static const struct attribute_group armv8_pmuv3_events_attr_group = {

 PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(event, "config:0-15");
 PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(long, "config1:0");
+PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(rdpmc, "config1:1");

 static int sysctl_perf_user_access __read_mostly;

@@ -306,9 +307,15 @@ static inline bool armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(struct perf_event *event)
      return event->attr.config1 & 0x1;
 }

+static inline bool armv8pmu_event_want_user_access(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+     return event->attr.config1 & 0x2;
+}
+
 static struct attribute *armv8_pmuv3_format_attrs[] = {
      &format_attr_event.attr,
      &format_attr_long.attr,
+     &format_attr_rdpmc.attr,
      NULL,
 };

@@ -377,7 +384,7 @@ static const struct attribute_group armv8_pmuv3_caps_attr_group = {
  */
 #define      ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER 0
 #define      ARMV8_IDX_COUNTER0      1
-
+#define      ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER_USER    32

 /*
  * We unconditionally enable ARMv8.5-PMU long event counter support

@@ -389,6 +396,15 @@ static bool armv8pmu_has_long_event(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu)
      return (cpu_pmu->pmuver >= ID_AA64DFR0_PMUVER_8_5);
 }

+static inline bool armv8pmu_event_can_chain(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+     struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu);
+
+     return !(event->hw.flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNT) &&
+            armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event) &&
+            !armv8pmu_has_long_event(cpu_pmu);

Could check against ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER here...

quoted

+}
+
 /*
  * We must chain two programmable counters for 64 bit events,
  * except when we have allocated the 64bit cycle counter (for CPU

@@ -398,11 +414,9 @@ static bool armv8pmu_has_long_event(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu)
 static inline bool armv8pmu_event_is_chained(struct perf_event *event)
 {
      int idx = event->hw.idx;
-     struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu);

      return !WARN_ON(idx < 0) &&
-            armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event) &&
-            !armv8pmu_has_long_event(cpu_pmu) &&
+            armv8pmu_event_can_chain(event) &&
             (idx != ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER);

... then we wouldn't need to here.

Hum, well armv8pmu_event_can_chain() is supposed to answer is there
any possibility that the event will ever be chained regardless of
whether it's assigned or not. Changing it would mostly work for idx<0,
but it could return the wrong answer if idx ==
ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER. However, that won't happen in the current
code (just as the WARN_ON won't). If we're going to smear the meaning,
then we only need one function here if we get rid of the WARN_ON. We
can call it armv8pmu_event_is_chained_or_might_be_chained() to make it
clear... JK (on the name)

quoted

quoted

 }

@@ -733,6 +747,35 @@ static inline u32 armv8pmu_getreset_flags(void)
      return value;
 }

+static void armv8pmu_disable_user_access(void)
+{
+     write_sysreg(0, pmuserenr_el0);
+}
+
+static void armv8pmu_enable_user_access(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu)
+{
+     struct pmu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(cpu_pmu->hw_events);
+
+     if (!sysctl_perf_user_access)
+             return;
+
+     if (!bitmap_empty(cpuc->dirty_mask, ARMPMU_MAX_HWEVENTS)) {
+             int i;
+             /* Don't need to clear assigned counters. */
+             bitmap_xor(cpuc->dirty_mask, cpuc->dirty_mask, cpuc->used_mask, ARMPMU_MAX_HWEVENTS);
+
+             for_each_set_bit(i, cpuc->dirty_mask, ARMPMU_MAX_HWEVENTS) {
+                     if (i == ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER)
+                             write_sysreg(0, pmccntr_el0);
+                     else
+                             armv8pmu_write_evcntr(i, 0);
+             }

Given that we can't expose individual counters, why isn't this just:

        for_each_clear_bit(i, cpuc->used_mask, ARMPMU_MAX_HWEVENTS)
                ...

and we could get rid of the dirty_mask altogether? i.e. just zero everything
that isn't assigned.

Sure. It's just an optimization following what x86 did.

Though we'd want to limit it to num_events, not ARMPMU_MAX_HWEVENTS.
No point in clearing nonexistent counters.

quoted

quoted

+             bitmap_zero(cpuc->dirty_mask, ARMPMU_MAX_HWEVENTS);
+     }
+
+     write_sysreg(ARMV8_PMU_USERENR_ER | ARMV8_PMU_USERENR_CR, pmuserenr_el0);
+}
+
 static void armv8pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event)
 {
      /*

@@ -776,6 +819,16 @@ static void armv8pmu_disable_event(struct perf_event *event)

 static void armv8pmu_start(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu)
 {
+     if (sysctl_perf_user_access) {

armv8pmu_enable_user_access() already checks this.

Yes, because not all callers (event_mapped) check it. I put it here so
we check it first and avoid checking all the subsequent conditions
when the feature is disabled. Though I guess the ordering here is not
guaranteed.

It also serves to avoid writing pmuserenr_el0 when user access is
disabled. However, there is a problem here when the sysctl is changed
from enabled to disabled. We stop touching pmuserenr_el0, so it may
get left enabled. So either we need an IPI in the sysctl to disable
access everywhere (like x86) or we need to do something like this:

struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx = this_cpu_ptr(cpu_pmu->pmu.pmu_cpu_context);
struct perf_event_context *task_ctx = cpuctx->task_ctx;
if (sysctl_perf_user_access && task_ctx && atomic_read(&task_ctx->nr_user))
        armv8pmu_enable_user_access(cpu_pmu);
else
        armv8pmu_disable_user_access();

I guess a third option is make the sysctl sticky. Once it gets
enabled, it stays enabled.

Rob