On Mon, May 14, 2018 at 11:16 PM, Richard Guy Briggs [off-list ref] wrote:

On 2018-05-15 13:06, Stephen Rothwell wrote:

quoted

Hi Paul,

Today's linux-next merge of the audit tree got a conflict in:

  security/selinux/selinuxfs.c

between commit:

  4195ed425d3c ("audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record")

from the selinux tree and commits:

  cdfb6b341f0f ("audit: use inline function to get audit context")
  d141136f523a ("audit: normalize MAC_POLICY_LOAD record")

from the audit tree.

I fixed it up (see below) and can carry the fix as necessary. This
is now fixed as far as linux-next is concerned, but any non trivial
conflicts should be mentioned to your upstream maintainer when your tree
is submitted for merging.  You may also want to consider cooperating
with the maintainer of the conflicting tree to minimise any particularly
complex conflicts.

This was expected...  It looks ok.

Agreed.  I had to apply the same patch to my testing kernels.

quoted

--
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell

diff --cc security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index c0cadbc5f85c,35fd77737c59..000000000000

--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c

@@@ -167,13 -167,11 +167,13 @@@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struc
                                    NULL);
              if (length)
                      goto out;
-             audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+             audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
 -                    "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
 +                    "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
 +                    " enabled=%d old-enabled=%d lsm=selinux res=1",
                      new_value, old_value,
                      from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 -                    audit_get_sessionid(current));
 +                    audit_get_sessionid(current),
 +                    selinux_enabled, selinux_enabled);
              enforcing_set(state, new_value);
              if (new_value)
                      avc_ss_reset(state->avc, 0);
@@@ -303,12 -299,10 +303,12 @@@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struc
              length = selinux_disable(fsi->state);
              if (length)
                      goto out;
-             audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+             audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
 -                    "selinux=0 auid=%u ses=%u",
 +                    "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
 +                    " enabled=%d old-enabled=%d lsm=selinux res=1",
 +                    enforcing, enforcing,
                      from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 -                    audit_get_sessionid(current));
 +                    audit_get_sessionid(current), 0, 1);
      }

      length = count;
@@@ -581,8 -575,8 +581,8 @@@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct fi
      length = count;

  out1:
-     audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
+     audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
 -            "policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u",
 +            "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1",
              from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
              audit_get_sessionid(current));
  out:

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs [off-list ref]
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com