Re: Runtime Memory Validation in Intel-TDX and AMD-SNP
From: Joerg Roedel <hidden>
Date: 2021-07-21 13:40:33
Also in:
linux-coco
From: Joerg Roedel <hidden>
Date: 2021-07-21 13:40:33
Also in:
linux-coco
On Tue, Jul 20, 2021 at 03:01:13PM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote:
On Tue, Jul 20, 2021 at 12:54:16PM -0700, Erdem Aktas wrote:quoted
I did not see any #VE implementation to handle SEPT violations when a page is in PENDING state. I am assuming that this needs to be supported at some point (If not then we need to discuss the use cases for such support).We actually plan to disable those #VEs, to avoid any problems with the system call gap. Instead the plan is that the kernel will know in advance what memory has been accepted or not, and accept it before touching.
This confuses me a bit, what happens when the VMM is malicious and re-maps an already accepted page and the TD tries to access it? My thinking was that this causes a #VE, but what happens instead when this #VE can be disabled? Regards, Joerg