Thread (73 messages) 73 messages, 9 authors, 2018-09-14

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 12/24] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Date: 2018-08-30 17:34:43
Also in: linux-api, linux-arch, linux-doc, lkml

On Aug 30, 2018, at 10:19 AM, Dave Hansen [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
On 08/30/2018 09:23 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
Three threads (A, B, C) run with the same CR3.

1. a dirty+writable PTE is placed directly in front of B's shadow stack.
  (this can happen, right? or is there a guard page?)
2. C's TLB caches the dirty+writable PTE.
3. A performs some syscall that triggers ptep_set_wrprotect().
4. A's syscall calls clear_bit().
5. B's TLB caches the transient shadow stack.
[now C has write access to B's transiently-extended shadow stack]
6. B recurses into the transiently-extended shadow stack
7. C overwrites the transiently-extended shadow stack area.
8. B returns through the transiently-extended shadow stack, giving
   the attacker instruction pointer control in B.
9. A's syscall broadcasts a TLB flush.
Heh, that's a good point.  The shadow stack permissions are *not*
strictly reduced because a page getting marked as shadow-stack has
*increased* permissions when being used as a shadow stack.  Fun.

For general hardening, it seems like we want to ensure that there's a
guard page at the bottom of the shadow stack.  Yu-cheng, do we have a
guard page?

But, to keep B's TLB from picking up the entry, I think we can just make
it !Present for a moment.  No TLB can cache it, and I believe the same
"don't set Dirty on a !Writable entry" logic also holds for !Present
(modulo a weird erratum or two).
Can we get documentation?  Pretty please?
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