Thread (97 messages) 97 messages, 20 authors, 2018-08-31

Re: TLB flushes on fixmap changes

From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Date: 2018-08-27 08:05:20
Also in: lkml

On Sun, 26 Aug 2018 20:26:09 -0700
Nadav Amit [off-list ref] wrote:
at 8:03 PM, Masami Hiramatsu [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
On Sun, 26 Aug 2018 11:09:58 +0200
Peter Zijlstra [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
On Sat, Aug 25, 2018 at 09:21:22PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
quoted
I just re-read text_poke().  It's, um, horrible.  Not only is the
implementation overcomplicated and probably buggy, but it's SLOOOOOW.
It's totally the wrong API -- poking one instruction at a time
basically can't be efficient on x86.  The API should either poke lots
of instructions at once or should be text_poke_begin(); ...;
text_poke_end();.
I don't think anybody ever cared about performance here. Only
correctness. That whole text_poke_bp() thing is entirely tricky.
Agreed. Self modification is a special event.
quoted
FWIW, before text_poke_bp(), text_poke() would only be used from
stop_machine, so all the other CPUs would be stuck busy-waiting with
IRQs disabled. These days, yeah, that's lots more dodgy, but yes
text_mutex should be serializing all that.
I'm still not sure that speculative page-table walk can be done
over the mutex. Also, if the fixmap area is for aliasing
pages (which always mapped to memory), what kind of
security issue can happen?
The PTE is accessible from other cores, so just as we assume for L1TF that
the every addressable memory might be cached in L1, we should assume and
PTE might be cached in the TLB when it is present.
Ok, so other cores can accidentally cache the PTE in TLB, (and no way
to shoot down explicitly?)
Although the mapping is for an alias, there are a couple of issues here.
First, this alias mapping is writable, so it might an attacker to change the
kernel code (following another initial attack).
Combined with some buffer overflow, correct? If the attacker already can
write a kernel data directly, he is in the kernel mode.
Second, the alias mapping is
never explicitly flushed. We may assume that once the original mapping is
removed/changed, a full TLB flush would take place, but there is no
guarantee it actually takes place.
Hmm, would this means a full TLB flush will not flush alias mapping?
(or, the full TLB flush just doesn't work?)
quoted
Anyway, from the viewpoint of kprobes, either per-cpu fixmap or
changing CR3 sounds good to me. I think we don't even need per-cpu,
it can call a thread/function on a dedicated core (like the first
boot processor) and wait :) This may prevent leakage of pte change
to other cores.
I implemented per-cpu fixmap, but I think that it makes more sense to take
peterz approach and set an entry in the PGD level. Per-CPU fixmap either
requires to pre-populate various levels in the page-table hierarchy, or
conditionally synchronize whenever module memory is allocated, since they
can share the same PGD, PUD & PMD. While usually the synchronization is not
needed, the possibility that synchronization is needed complicates locking.
Could you point which PeterZ approach you said? I guess it will be
make a clone of PGD and use it for local page mapping (as new mm).
If so, yes it sounds perfectly fine to me.
Anyhow, having fixed addresses for the fixmap can be used to circumvent
KASLR.
I think text_poke doesn't mind using random address :)
I don’t think a dedicated core is needed. Anyhow there is a lock
(text_mutex), so use_mm() can be used after acquiring the mutex.
Hmm, use_mm() said;

/*
 * use_mm
 *      Makes the calling kernel thread take on the specified
 *      mm context.
 *      (Note: this routine is intended to be called only
 *      from a kernel thread context)
 */

So maybe we need a dedicated kernel thread for safeness?

Thank you,

-- 
Masami Hiramatsu [off-list ref]
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