Re: [PATCHv5 19/19] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME
From: Pavel Machek <hidden>
Date: 2018-08-15 07:48:17
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lkml
Hi!
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Add new config option to enabled/disable Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption support. MKTME uses MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING to reserve enough space in per-KeyID direct mappings for memory hotplug. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <redacted> --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index b6f1785c2176..023a22568c06 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig@@ -1523,6 +1523,23 @@ config ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT def_bool y depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +config X86_INTEL_MKTME + bool "Intel Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption" + select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK + select PAGE_EXTENSION + depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL + ---help--- + Say yes to enable support for Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption. + This requires an Intel processor that has support of the feature. + + Multikey Total Memory Encryption (MKTME) is a technology that allows + transparent memory encryption in upcoming Intel platforms. + + MKTME is built on top of TME. TME allows encryption of the entirety + of system memory using a single key. MKTME allows having multiple + encryption domains, each having own key -- different memory pages can + be encrypted with different keys. + # Common NUMA Features config NUMA bool "Numa Memory Allocation and Scheduler Support"
Would it be good to provide documentation, or link to documentation, explaining what security guarantees this is supposed to provide, and what disadvantages (if any) it has? I guess it costs a bit of performance... I see that TME helps with cold boot attacks. Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html