Re: [RFC PATCH] Randomization of address chosen by mmap.
From: lazytyped <hidden>
Date: 2018-02-27 21:31:38
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From: lazytyped <hidden>
Date: 2018-02-27 21:31:38
Also in:
lkml
On 2/27/18 9:52 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
I'd like more details on the threat model here; if it's just a matter of .so loading order, I wonder if load order randomization would get a comparable level of uncertainty without the memory fragmentation,
This also seems to assume that leaking the address of one single library isn't enough to mount a ROP attack to either gain enough privileges or generate a primitive that can leak further information. Is this really the case? Do you have some further data around this? A A A A A A -A twiz -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>