Thread (23 messages) 23 messages, 6 authors, 2018-03-05

Re: [RFC PATCH] Randomization of address chosen by mmap.

From: lazytyped <hidden>
Date: 2018-02-27 21:31:38
Also in: lkml


On 2/27/18 9:52 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
I'd like more details on the threat model here; if it's just a matter
of .so loading order, I wonder if load order randomization would get a
comparable level of uncertainty without the memory fragmentation,
This also seems to assume that leaking the address of one single library
isn't enough to mount a ROP attack to either gain enough privileges or
generate a primitive that can leak further information. Is this really
the case? Do you have some further data around this?


A A A A A A  -A  twiz

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