Re: [RFC][PATCH v3 1/2] mm/page_poison.c: Enable PAGE_POISONING as a separate option
From: Laura Abbott <hidden>
Date: 2016-02-26 22:21:10
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On 02/25/2016 09:34 PM, Jianyu Zhan wrote:
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 12:45 PM, Laura Abbott [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
Do you have some suggestion on wording here? I'm not sure what else to say besides poison patterns to differentiate from hardware poison.Is the below wording OK? config PAGE_POISONING bool bool "Poison pages after freeing" select PAGE_EXTENSION select PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY if HIBERNATION ---help--- Fill the pages with poison patterns after free_pages() and verify the patterns before alloc_pages. The filling of the memory helps reduce the risk of information leaks from freed data. This does have a potential performance impact. Note that "poison" here is not the same thing as that in "HWPoison" for CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE, in which "poison" is just a nomenclature borrowed from Intel , for the processor support for "poisoned" memory, an adaptive method for flagging and recovering from memory errors
Okay, I see what you are getting at here. This sounds okay.
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+config PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY + depends on PAGE_POISONING + bool "Only poison, don't sanity check" + ---help--- + Skip the sanity checking on alloc, only fill the pages with + poison on free. This reduces some of the overhead of the + poisoning feature. + + If you are only interested in sanitization, say Y. Otherwise + say N.diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile index fb1a7948c107..ec59c071b4f9 100644 --- a/mm/Makefile +++ b/mm/Makefile@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_slob.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_slab.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_slub.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_page_alloc.o := n -KCOV_INSTRUMENT_debug-pagealloc.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_kmemleak.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_kmemcheck.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_memcontrol.o := n@@ -63,9 +62,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP) += sparse-vmemmap.o obj-$(CONFIG_SLOB) += slob.o obj-$(CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER) += mmu_notifier.o obj-$(CONFIG_KSM) += ksm.o -ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC - obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC) += debug-pagealloc.o -endif obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING) += page_poison.o obj-$(CONFIG_SLAB) += slab.o obj-$(CONFIG_SLUB) += slub.odiff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index a34c359d8e81..0bdb3cfd83b5 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c@@ -1026,6 +1026,7 @@ static bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,unsigned int order) PAGE_SIZE << order); } arch_free_page(page, order); + kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order, 0); kernel_map_pages(page, 1 << order, 0); return true;@@ -1497,6 +1498,7 @@ static int prep_new_page(struct page *page,unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags, arch_alloc_page(page, order); kernel_map_pages(page, 1 << order, 1); + kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order, 1); kasan_alloc_pages(page, order); if (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO)diff --git a/mm/page_poison.c b/mm/page_poison.c index 92ead727b8f0..884a6f854432 100644 --- a/mm/page_poison.c +++ b/mm/page_poison.c@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static void poison_page(struct page *page) kunmap_atomic(addr); } -void poison_pages(struct page *page, int n) +static void poison_pages(struct page *page, int n) { int i;@@ -101,6 +101,9 @@ static void check_poison_mem(unsigned char *mem,size_t bytes) unsigned char *start; unsigned char *end; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY)) + return; + start = memchr_inv(mem, PAGE_POISON, bytes); if (!start) return;@@ -113,9 +116,9 @@ static void check_poison_mem(unsigned char *mem,size_t bytes) if (!__ratelimit(&ratelimit)) return; else if (start == end && single_bit_flip(*start, PAGE_POISON)) - printk(KERN_ERR "pagealloc: single bit error\n"); + pr_err("pagealloc: single bit error\n"); else - printk(KERN_ERR "pagealloc: memory corruption\n"); + pr_err("pagealloc: memory corruption\n"); print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, start, end - start + 1, 1);@@ -135,10 +138,28 @@ static void unpoison_page(struct page *page) kunmap_atomic(addr); } -void unpoison_pages(struct page *page, int n) +static void unpoison_pages(struct page *page, int n) { int i; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) unpoison_page(page + i); } + +void kernel_poison_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable) +{ + if (!page_poisoning_enabled()) + return; + + if (enable) + unpoison_pages(page, numpages); + else + poison_pages(page, numpages); +} + +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC +void __kernel_map_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable) +{ + /* This function does nothing, all work is done via poison pages*/ +} +#endifIMHO, kernel_map_pages is originally incorporated for debugging page allocation. And latter for archs that do not support arch-specific page poisoning, a software poisoning method was used. So I think it is not appropriate to use two interfaces in the alloc/free hooks. The kernel_poison_pages actually should be an implementation detail and should be hided in the kernel_map_pages interface.We want to have the poisoning independent of anything that kernel_map_pages does. It was originally added for software poisoning for arches that didn't have the full ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC support but there's nothing that specifically ties it to mapping. It's beneficial even when we aren't mapping/unmapping the pages so putting it in kernel_map_pages would defeat what we're trying to accomplish here.Ok, fair enough. If so, I suggest you add this clarification into the code, or as least, in the changelog.
Sounds fine.
Thanks, Jianyu Zhan
Thanks, Laura -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>