[PATCH 03/15] memfd_secret.2: Minor tweaks to Mike's patch
From: Alejandro Colomar <hidden>
Date: 2021-09-10 22:47:27
Subsystem:
the rest · Maintainer:
Linus Torvalds
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <redacted> --- man2/memfd_secret.2 | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/man2/memfd_secret.2 b/man2/memfd_secret.2
index 869480b48..1b4e82954 100644
--- a/man2/memfd_secret.2
+++ b/man2/memfd_secret.2@@ -148,7 +148,6 @@ The .BR memfd_secret () system call is Linux-specific. .SH NOTES -.PP The .BR memfd_secret () system call is designed to allow a user-space process
@@ -160,7 +159,6 @@ memory ranges backed by in any circumstances, but nevertheless, it is much harder to exfiltrate data from these regions. .PP -The .BR memfd_secret () provides the following protections: .IP \(bu 3
@@ -177,7 +175,7 @@ which significantly increases difficulty of the attack, especially when other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization are in place. .IP \(bu -Prevent cross-process userspace memory exposures. +Prevent cross-process user-space memory exposures. Once a region for a .BR memfd_secret () memory mapping is allocated,
@@ -191,7 +189,7 @@ In order to access memory areas backed by .BR memfd_secret(), a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, -or spawn a new privileged userspace process to perform +or spawn a new privileged user-space process to perform secrets exfiltration using .BR ptrace (2). .PP
--
2.33.0