Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] fcntl: fix potential deadlocks for &fown_struct.lock
From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <hidden>
Date: 2021-07-07 06:54:24
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linux-fsdevel, lkml
On 7/7/21 2:05 pm, Greg KH wrote:
On Wed, Jul 07, 2021 at 10:35:47AM +0800, Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi wrote:quoted
Syzbot reports a potential deadlock in do_fcntl: ======================================================== WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected 5.12.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted -------------------------------------------------------- syz-executor132/8391 just changed the state of lock: ffff888015967bf8 (&f->f_owner.lock){.+..}-{2:2}, at: f_getown_ex fs/fcntl.c:211 [inline] ffff888015967bf8 (&f->f_owner.lock){.+..}-{2:2}, at: do_fcntl+0x8b4/0x1200 fs/fcntl.c:395 but this lock was taken by another, HARDIRQ-safe lock in the past: (&dev->event_lock){-...}-{2:2} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &dev->event_lock --> &new->fa_lock --> &f->f_owner.lock Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&f->f_owner.lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(&dev->event_lock); lock(&new->fa_lock); <Interrupt> lock(&dev->event_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** This happens because there is a lock hierarchy of &dev->event_lock --> &new->fa_lock --> &f->f_owner.lock from the following call chain: input_inject_event(): spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock,...); input_handle_event(): input_pass_values(): input_to_handler(): evdev_events(): evdev_pass_values(): spin_lock(&client->buffer_lock); __pass_event(): kill_fasync(): kill_fasync_rcu(): read_lock(&fa->fa_lock); send_sigio(): read_lock_irqsave(&fown->lock,...); However, since &dev->event_lock is HARDIRQ-safe, interrupts have to be disabled while grabbing &f->f_owner.lock, otherwise we invert the lock hierarchy. Hence, we replace calls to read_lock/read_unlock on &f->f_owner.lock, with read_lock_irq/read_unlock_irq. Here read_lock_irq/read_unlock_irq should be safe to use because the functions f_getown_ex and f_getowner_uids are only called from do_fcntl, and f_getown is only called from do_fnctl and sock_ioctl. do_fnctl itself is only called from syscalls. For sock_ioctl, the chain is compat_sock_ioctl(): compat_sock_ioctl_trans(): sock_ioctl() And interrupts are not disabled on either path. We assert this assumption with WARN_ON_ONCE(irqs_disabled()). This check is also inserted into another use of write_lock_irq in f_modown. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e6d5398a02c516ce5e70@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <redacted> --- fs/fcntl.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)diff --git a/fs/fcntl.c b/fs/fcntl.c index dfc72f15be7f..262235e02c4b 100644 --- a/fs/fcntl.c +++ b/fs/fcntl.c@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static int setfl(int fd, struct file * filp, unsigned long arg) static void f_modown(struct file *filp, struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type, int force) { + WARN_ON_ONCE(irqs_disabled());If this triggers, you just rebooted the box :( Please never do this, either properly handle the problem and return an error, or do not check for this. It is not any type of "fix" at all, and at most, a debugging aid while you work on the root problem. thanks, greg k-h
Hi Greg, Thanks for the feedback. My bad, I was under the impression that WARN_ON_ONCE could be used to document assumptions for other developers, but I'll stick to using it for debugging in the future. I think then in this case it would be best to keep the reasoning for why the *_irq() locks are safe to use in the commit message. I'll update the patch accordingly. Best wishes, Desmond _______________________________________________ Linux-kernel-mentees mailing list Linux-kernel-mentees@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-kernel-mentees