diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index e1a04bd3b9e5..85618e726801 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Description:
[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
[KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
[KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA]
- [SETXATTR_CHECK]
+ [SETXATTR_CHECK] [TRUSTED_FOR_CHECK]
mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
[[^]MAY_EXEC]
fsmagic:= hex value
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index be965a8715e4..827236dbbefb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \
hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data) \
hook(SETXATTR_CHECK, setxattr_check) \
+ hook(TRUSTED_FOR_CHECK, trusted_for_check) \
hook(MAX_CHECK, none)
#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 465865412100..e09054ac3352 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/iversion.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/trusted-for.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -519,6 +520,28 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
+/**
+ * ima_trusted_for - based on policy, measure/appraise/audit measurement
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
+ * @usage: limit enumeration to TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION
+ *
+ * Measure/appraise/audit files being executed by an interpreter.
+ *
+ * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_trusted_for(struct file *file, const enum trusted_for_usage usage)
+{
+ u32 secid;
+
+ if (usage != TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION)
+ return 0;
+
+ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ 0, MAY_EXEC, TRUSTED_FOR_CHECK);
+}
+
static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
{
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 320ca80aacab..847803a24201 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1210,6 +1210,7 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
case POST_SETATTR:
case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
case POLICY_CHECK:
+ case TRUSTED_FOR_CHECK:
if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_FSMAGIC |
IMA_UID | IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID |
IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
@@ -1423,6 +1424,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
/* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "TRUSTED_FOR_CHECK") == 0)
+ entry->func = TRUSTED_FOR_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
entry->func = MODULE_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0)
--
2.27.0