Thread (2 messages) 2 messages, 2 authors, 2020-07-20

Re: [PATCH v3 07/12] ima: Fail rule parsing when appraise_flag=blacklist is unsupportable

From: Tyler Hicks <hidden>
Date: 2020-07-17 18:11:38
Also in: linux-security-module, lkml
Subsystem: extended verification module (evm), integrity measurement architecture (ima), security subsystem, the rest · Maintainers: Mimi Zohar, Roberto Sassu, Dmitry Kasatkin, Paul Moore, James Morris, "Serge E. Hallyn", Linus Torvalds

Possibly related (same subject, not in this thread)

On 2020-07-17 13:40:22, Nayna wrote:
On 7/9/20 2:19 AM, Tyler Hicks wrote:
quoted
The "appraise_flag" option is only appropriate for appraise actions
and its "blacklist" value is only appropriate when
CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is enabled and "appraise_flag=blacklist" is
only appropriate when "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" is also present.
Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume
that other uses of "appraise_flag=blacklist" are supported.

Fixes: 273df864cf74 ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <redacted>
Cc: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
---

* v3
   - New patch

  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
  1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 81da02071d41..9842e2e0bc6d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1035,6 +1035,11 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  		return false;
  	}
+	/* Ensure that combinations of flags are compatible with each other */
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST &&
+	    !(entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED))
+		return false;
+
  	return true;
  }
@@ -1371,8 +1376,14 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  				result = -EINVAL;
  			break;
  		case Opt_appraise_flag:
+			if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
  			ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_flag", args[0].from);
-			if (strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
+			    strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
  				entry->flags |= IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
If IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is disabled, it will allow the following rule to
load, which is not as expected.

"appraise func=xxx_CHECK appraise_flag=blacklist appraise_type=imasig"

Missing is the "else" condition to immediately reject the policy rule.
Thanks for the review. You're right. This change is needed:
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 9842e2e0bc6d..cf3ddb38dfa8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1385,6 +1385,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
 			    strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
 				entry->flags |= IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
+			else
+				result = -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		case Opt_permit_directio:
 			entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;

Making this change does not conflict with any later patches in the
series.

Mimi, I've rebased and force pushed to my fixup branch with this change,
for your comparison:

 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/linux.git/log/?h=next-integrity-testing-fixup

Tyler
Thanks & Regards,

     - Nayna
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