Re: [-next PATCH] security: use octal not symbolic permissions

On 6/13/2018 12:57 PM, Paul Moore wrote:

On Wed, Jun 13, 2018 at 3:30 PM, Joe Perches [off-list ref] wrote:

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On Wed, 2018-06-13 at 12:19 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:

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On Wed, Jun 13, 2018 at 12:04 PM, Joe Perches [off-list ref] wrote:

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On Wed, 2018-06-13 at 11:49 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:

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On Tue, Jun 12, 2018 at 8:29 PM, Joe Perches [off-list ref] wrote:

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On Tue, 2018-06-12 at 17:12 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:

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Joe, in general I really appreciate the fixes you send, but these
patches that cross a lot of subsystem boundaries (this isn't the first
one that does this) causes unnecessary conflicts in -next and during
the merge window.  Could you split your patches up from now on please?

Sorry. No.  Merge conflicts are inherent in this system.

Yes, merge conflicts are inherent in this system when one makes a
single change which impacts multiple subsystems, e.g. changing a core
kernel function which is called by multiple subsystems.  However, that
isn't what this patch does, it makes a number of self-contained
changes across multiple subsystems; there are no cross-subsystem
dependencies in this patch.  You are increasing the likelihood of
conflicts for no good reason; that is why I'm asking you to split this
patch and others like it.

No.  History shows with high certainty that splitting
patches like this across multiple subsystems of a primary
subsystem means that the entire patchset is not completely
applied.

I think that is due more to a lack of effort on the part of the patch
author to keep pushing the individual patches.

Nope.  Try again.

Resistance to change and desire for status quo
occurs in many subsystems.

Which gets back to the need for persistence on the part of the patch
author.  If your solution to a stubborn susbsystem is to go around
them by convincing another, potentially unrelated subsystem, to merge
the patch then I firmly believe you are doing it wrong.

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It's _much_ simpler and provides a generic mechanism to
get the entire patch applied to send a single patch to the
top level subsystem maintainer.

I understand it is simpler for you, but it is more difficult for everyone else.

Not true.

I think we are at the agree to disagree stage.

The way you have structured this patch it makes it easier for you to
submit, but makes it potentially more difficult for me (likely other
LSM maintainers too), the -next folks, and Linus.

I am agreeing with Paul. There is no reason that I/he should
be compelled to accept the Smack/SELinux patches because he/I
accepted the SELinux/Smack bits.

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It's simply a matter of merge resolution being pushed down
where and when necessary.

See changes like the additions of the SPDX license tags.

Please don't even try to suggest that this trivial patch you are
proposing is even remotely as significant as the SPDX change.  There
are always going to be exceptions to every rule, and with each
exception there needs to be a solid reason behind the change.  The
SPDX change had a legitimate reason (legal concern) for doing it the
way it was done; this patch isn't close to that level of concern.

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Further, where the LSMs are concerned, there is no "top level
subsystem maintainer" anymore.  SELinux and AppArmor send pull
requests directly to Linus.

MAINTAINERS-SECURITY SUBSYSTEM
MAINTAINERS-M:  James Morris [off-list ref]
MAINTAINERS-M:  "Serge E. Hallyn" [off-list ref]
MAINTAINERS-L:  linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (suggested Cc:)
MAINTAINERS-T:  git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git
MAINTAINERS-W:  http://kernsec.org/
MAINTAINERS-S:  Supported
MAINTAINERS:F:  security/
MAINTAINERS-

If James is not approving or merging security/selinux or
security/tomoyo then perhaps the F: entries could be
augmented with appropriate X: entries or made specific
by using specific entries like:

F:      security/*
F:      security/integrity/
F:      security/keys/

There are already F: entries for security/selinux, security/smack
and security/apparmor so I don't get your point.

That is a good point.  I'll put together a patch for selinux/next as
soon as the merge window closes.  I'll let the other LSMs do as they
see fit.  As I said previously, I believe the only other LSM that
sends directly to Linux is AppArmor.

Smack will continue using the security subsystem so long as
James offers the service. There's overhead in setting up the
environment for sending directly to Linus that I'm in no rush
to incur.