Re: [PATCH 1/2] HID: Intel-thc-hid: Intel-quicki2c: Use hid_safe_input_report()
From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Date: 2026-09-22 03:03:45
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [High] hid: intel-quicki2c: OOB memory access due to unadjusted buffer size in hid_safe_input_report() -- commit fd2fb2220e67b32415f7045570713d7e64755020 Author: Even Xu [off-list ref] HID: Intel-thc-hid: Intel-quicki2c: Use hid_safe_input_report() This commit replaces the deprecated hid_input_report() with hid_safe_input_report(). It tracks the allocated size of the input buffer and passes it along to allow hid-core to validate the reported data length against the actual buffer size.
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diff --git a/drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/intel-quicki2c/pci-quicki2c.c b/drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/intel-quicki2c/pci-quicki2c.c index 0d2ad7bc3648a..6cf19dac8e181 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/intel-quicki2c/pci-quicki2c.c +++ b/drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/intel-quicki2c/pci-quicki2c.c@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static int handle_input_report(struct quicki2c_device *qcdev) if (qcdev->state != QUICKI2C_ENABLED) continue; - quicki2c_hid_send_report(qcdev, pkt->data, + quicki2c_hid_send_report(qcdev, pkt->data, qcdev->input_len, HIDI2C_DATA_LEN(le16_to_cpu(pkt->len)));
[Severity: High] Does this code pass the unadjusted buffer size when pkt->data is offset by 2 bytes from the start of the buffer? The buffer qcdev->input_buf is dynamically allocated to qcdev->input_len bytes. Since pkt is mapped to qcdev->input_buf, pkt->data is offset by HIDI2C_LENGTH_LEN (2 bytes) from the start of the allocation. Passing the full qcdev->input_len overstates the remaining capacity for pkt->data by 2 bytes. [ ... ]
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diff --git a/drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/intel-quicki2c/quicki2c-hid.c b/drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/intel-quicki2c/quicki2c-hid.c index 8075992e8732e..1a220a50d934c 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/intel-quicki2c/quicki2c-hid.c +++ b/drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/intel-quicki2c/quicki2c-hid.c
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@@ -157,16 +157,18 @@ void quicki2c_hid_remove(struct quicki2c_device *qcdev) * * @qcdev: point to quicki2c device * @data: point to input report data buffer + * @buf_size: the allocated size of the input report data buffer * @data_len: the length of input report data * * Return: 0 on success, non zero on error. */ int quicki2c_hid_send_report(struct quicki2c_device *qcdev, - void *data, size_t data_len) + void *data, size_t buf_size, size_t data_len) { int ret; - ret = hid_input_report(qcdev->hid_dev, HID_INPUT_REPORT, data, data_len, 1); + ret = hid_safe_input_report(qcdev->hid_dev, HID_INPUT_REPORT, data, + buf_size, data_len, 1);
[Severity: High] Can passing this unadjusted buf_size to hid_safe_input_report() lead to an out-of-bounds access? If a device sends a pkt->len such that HIDI2C_DATA_LEN(pkt->len) equals qcdev->input_len, hid_safe_input_report() will trust the data length since it does not exceed the provided buf_size. This would neutralize the core's bounds checks, allowing the core to read or zero-pad 2 bytes past the end of the qcdev->input_buf allocation. -- Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260922025437.940072-1-even.xu@intel.com?part=1