Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] Drivers: hv: vmbus: add vmbus_establish_gpadl_caller_decrypted()
From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Date: 2026-07-22 19:57:30
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: Pre-existing issues: - [High] This problem wasn't introduced by this patch, but vmbus_teardown_gpadl() silently overwrites the error code from vmbus_post_msg(), causing it to falsely report success when GPADL teardown fails, leading to use-after-free memory corruption. --
--- Patch [1]: [RFC PATCH 1/2] Drivers: hv: vmbus: add vmbus_establish_gpadl_caller_decrypted() ---commit 93ae4b1e666b7bf013113501ce3aaa80b55f1c28
Author: Kameron Carr [off-list ref]
Drivers: hv: vmbus: add vmbus_establish_gpadl_caller_decrypted()
Refactor vmbus_establish_gpadl() to separate the encryption lifecycle
from the rest of the GPADL establishment logic. Add a new
vmbus_establish_gpadl_caller_decrypted() for callers that want
to decrypt their own buffers.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
diff --git a/drivers/hv/channel.c b/drivers/hv/channel.c index 6821f225248b1..0166367a4df37 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/channel.c +++ b/drivers/hv/channel.c
[ ... ]
+int vmbus_establish_gpadl_caller_decrypted(struct vmbus_channel *channel,
+ void *kbuffer, u32 size,
+ struct vmbus_gpadl *gpadl)
+{
+ int ret = __vmbus_establish_gpadl(channel, HV_GPADL_BUFFER, kbuffer,
+ size, 0U, gpadl);
+
+ /* Caller owns @kbuffer's encryption; teardown must not touch it. */
+ gpadl->decrypted = false;
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does setting gpadl->decrypted
to false here interact with a pre-existing issue in vmbus_teardown_gpadl()
that masks teardown failures?
In vmbus_teardown_gpadl(), if vmbus_post_msg() fails (e.g., due to host
resource starvation), the error code in the ret variable is overwritten
unconditionally before the function returns:
drivers/hv/channel.c:vmbus_teardown_gpadl() {
...
ret = vmbus_post_msg(msg,
sizeof(struct vmbus_channel_gpadl_teardown), true);
trace_vmbus_teardown_gpadl(msg, ret);
if (ret)
goto post_msg_err;
...
post_msg_err:
...
if (gpadl->decrypted)
ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)gpadl->buffer,
PFN_UP(gpadl->size));
else
ret = 0;
...
return ret;
}
Since gpadl->decrypted is set to false for these caller-managed GPADLs,
if vmbus_post_msg() fails during teardown, the else branch will set ret = 0.
Could this cause vmbus_teardown_gpadl() to falsely report success when
the teardown actually failed? If the caller then frees the buffer while
the hypervisor still holds a mapping to it, could it lead to memory
corruption across the VM boundary?
+ return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vmbus_establish_gpadl_caller_decrypted);
-- Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260721195633.1438361-1-kameroncarr@linux.microsoft.com?part=1