RE: [PATCH 0/3] Prevent out-of-bounds access for built-in font data buffers
From: David Laight <hidden>
Date: 2020-09-24 14:42:26
Also in:
dri-devel, linux-kernel-mentees, lkml
From: David Laight <hidden>
Date: 2020-09-24 14:42:26
Also in:
dri-devel, linux-kernel-mentees, lkml
On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 09:38:22AM -0400, Peilin Ye wrote:quoted
Hi all, syzbot has reported [1] a global out-of-bounds read issue in fbcon_get_font(). A malicious user may resize `vc_font.height` to a large value in vt_ioctl(), causing fbcon_get_font() to overflow our built-in font data buffers, declared in lib/fonts/font_*.c:
...
quoted
(drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c) if (font->width <= 8) { j = vc->vc_font.height; + if (font->charcount * j > FNTSIZE(fontdata)) + return -EINVAL;
Can that still go wrong because the multiply wraps? David - Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)