Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Date: 2021-06-10 15:51:03
Also in:
kvm, linux-coco, linux-crypto, linux-mm, lkml, platform-driver-x86
Subsystem:
the rest, x86 architecture (32-bit and 64-bit) · Maintainers:
Linus Torvalds, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen
On Wed, Jun 02, 2021 at 09:04:05AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
@@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ extern bool handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs); /* RMP page size */ #define RMP_PG_SIZE_4K 0 +/* Memory opertion for snp_prep_memory() */ +enum snp_mem_op { + MEMORY_PRIVATE, + MEMORY_SHARED
See below.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+}; + #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT extern struct static_key_false sev_es_enable_key; extern void __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);@@ -103,6 +109,11 @@ static inline int pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, bool validate) return rc; } +void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, + unsigned int npages); +void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, + unsigned int npages);
Align arguments on the opening brace.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, int op); #else static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { } static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }@@ -110,6 +121,15 @@ static inline int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) { ret static inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) { } static inline int sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd) { return 0; } static inline int pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, bool validate) { return 0; } +static inline void __init +early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages)
Put those { } at the end of the line:
early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) { }
no need for separate lines. Ditto below.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+{ +} +static inline void __init +early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) +{ +} +static inline void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, int op) { } #endif #endifdiff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c index 455c09a9b2c2..6e9b45bb38ab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c@@ -532,6 +532,111 @@ static u64 get_jump_table_addr(void) return ret; } +static void pvalidate_pages(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages, bool validate) +{ + unsigned long vaddr_end; + int rc; + + vaddr = vaddr & PAGE_MASK; + vaddr_end = vaddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT); + + while (vaddr < vaddr_end) { + rc = pvalidate(vaddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, validate); + if (WARN(rc, "Failed to validate address 0x%lx ret %d", vaddr, rc)) + sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
^^ I guess that 1 should be a define too, if we have to be correct: sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE); or so. Ditto for all other calls of this.
+
+ vaddr = vaddr + PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+}
+
+static void __init early_set_page_state(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, int op)
+{
+ unsigned long paddr_end;
+ u64 val;
+
+ paddr = paddr & PAGE_MASK;
+ paddr_end = paddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+ while (paddr < paddr_end) {
+ /*
+ * Use the MSR protocol because this function can be called before the GHCB
+ * is established.
+ */
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ_GFN(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, op));
+ VMGEXIT();
+
+ val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
+
+ if (GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP)From a previous review: Does that one need a warning too or am I being too paranoid?
+ goto e_term;
+
+ if (WARN(GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val),
+ "Failed to change page state to '%s' paddr 0x%lx error 0x%llx\n",
+ op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE ? "private" : "shared",
+ paddr, GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val)))
+ goto e_term;
+
+ paddr = paddr + PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ return;
+
+e_term:
+ sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_PSC);
+}
+
+void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
+ unsigned int npages)
+{
+ if (!sev_feature_enabled(SEV_SNP))
+ return;
+
+ /* Ask hypervisor to add the memory pages in RMP table as a 'private'. */Ask the hypervisor to mark the memory pages as private in the RMP table.
+ early_set_page_state(paddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE);
+
+ /* Validate the memory pages after they've been added in the RMP table. */
+ pvalidate_pages(vaddr, npages, 1);
+}
+
+void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
+ unsigned int npages)
+{
+ if (!sev_feature_enabled(SEV_SNP))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Invalidate the memory pages before they are marked shared in the
+ * RMP table.
+ */
+ pvalidate_pages(vaddr, npages, 0);
+
+ /* Ask hypervisor to make the memory pages shared in the RMP table. */mark
+ early_set_page_state(paddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED);
+}
+
+void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, int op)
+{
+ unsigned long vaddr, npages;
+
+ vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr);
+ npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ switch (op) {
+ case MEMORY_PRIVATE: {
+ early_snp_set_memory_private(vaddr, paddr, npages);
+ return;
+ }
+ case MEMORY_SHARED: {
+ early_snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, paddr, npages);
+ return;
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ WARN(1, "invalid memory op %d\n", op);A lot easier, diff ontop of your patch: ---
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 7c2cb5300e43..2ad4b5ab3f6c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h@@ -65,12 +65,6 @@ extern bool handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs); /* RMP page size */ #define RMP_PG_SIZE_4K 0 -/* Memory opertion for snp_prep_memory() */ -enum snp_mem_op { - MEMORY_PRIVATE, - MEMORY_SHARED -}; - #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT extern struct static_key_false sev_es_enable_key; extern void __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 2a5dce42af35..991d7964cee9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c@@ -662,20 +662,13 @@ void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, int op) vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr); npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT; - switch (op) { - case MEMORY_PRIVATE: { + if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE) early_snp_set_memory_private(vaddr, paddr, npages); - return; - } - case MEMORY_SHARED: { + else if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED) early_snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, paddr, npages); - return; + else { + WARN(1, "invalid memory page op %d\n", op); } - default: - break; - } - - WARN(1, "invalid memory op %d\n", op); } int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) ---
static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); +/* + * When SNP is active, changes the page state from private to shared before
s/changes/change/
+ * copying the data from the source to destination and restore after the copy.
+ * This is required because the source address is mapped as decrypted by the
+ * caller of the routine.
+ */
+static inline void __init snp_memcpy(void *dst, void *src, size_t sz,
+ unsigned long paddr, bool decrypt)
+{
+ unsigned long npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ if (!sev_feature_enabled(SEV_SNP) || !decrypt) {
+ memcpy(dst, src, sz);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the paddr needs to be accessed decrypted, mark the pageWhat do you mean "If" - this is the SNP version of memcpy. Just say: /* * With SNP, the page address needs to be ... */
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+ * shared in the RMP table before copying it. + */ + early_snp_set_memory_shared((unsigned long)__va(paddr), paddr, npages); + + memcpy(dst, src, sz); + + /* Restore the page state after the memcpy. */ + early_snp_set_memory_private((unsigned long)__va(paddr), paddr, npages); +} + /* * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is@@ -96,8 +125,8 @@ static void __init __sme_early_enc_dec(resource_size_t paddr, * Use a temporary buffer, of cache-line multiple size, to * avoid data corruption as documented in the APM. */ - memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len); - memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len); + snp_memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len, paddr, enc); + snp_memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len, paddr, !enc); early_memunmap(dst, len); early_memunmap(src, len);@@ -277,9 +306,23 @@ static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc) else sme_early_decrypt(pa, size); + /* + * If page is getting mapped decrypted in the page table, then the page state + * change in the RMP table must happen before the page table updates. + */ + if (!enc) + early_snp_set_memory_shared((unsigned long)__va(pa), pa, 1);
Merge the two branches:
/* Encrypt/decrypt the contents in-place */
if (enc) {
sme_early_encrypt(pa, size);
} else {
sme_early_decrypt(pa, size);
/*
* On SNP, the page state change in the RMP table must happen
* before the page table updates.
*/
early_snp_set_memory_shared((unsigned long)__va(pa), pa, 1);
}
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette