Thread (86 messages) 86 messages, 6 authors, 2021-07-05

Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Date: 2021-06-10 15:51:03
Also in: kvm, linux-coco, linux-crypto, linux-mm, lkml, platform-driver-x86
Subsystem: the rest, x86 architecture (32-bit and 64-bit) · Maintainers: Linus Torvalds, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen

On Wed, Jun 02, 2021 at 09:04:05AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
@@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ extern bool handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs);
 /* RMP page size */
 #define RMP_PG_SIZE_4K			0
 
+/* Memory opertion for snp_prep_memory() */
+enum snp_mem_op {
+	MEMORY_PRIVATE,
+	MEMORY_SHARED
See below.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+};
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 extern struct static_key_false sev_es_enable_key;
 extern void __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
@@ -103,6 +109,11 @@ static inline int pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, bool validate)
 
 	return rc;
 }
+void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
+		unsigned int npages);
+void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
+		unsigned int npages);
Align arguments on the opening brace.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, int op);
 #else
 static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
 static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
@@ -110,6 +121,15 @@ static inline int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) { ret
 static inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) { }
 static inline int sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd) { return 0; }
 static inline int pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, bool validate) { return 0; }
+static inline void __init
+early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages)
Put those { } at the end of the line:

early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) { }

no need for separate lines. Ditto below.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+{
+}
+static inline void __init
+early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages)
+{
+}
+static inline void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, int op) { }
 #endif
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 455c09a9b2c2..6e9b45bb38ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -532,6 +532,111 @@ static u64 get_jump_table_addr(void)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static void pvalidate_pages(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages, bool validate)
+{
+	unsigned long vaddr_end;
+	int rc;
+
+	vaddr = vaddr & PAGE_MASK;
+	vaddr_end = vaddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+	while (vaddr < vaddr_end) {
+		rc = pvalidate(vaddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, validate);
+		if (WARN(rc, "Failed to validate address 0x%lx ret %d", vaddr, rc))
+			sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
					^^

I guess that 1 should be a define too, if we have to be correct:

			sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);

or so. Ditto for all other calls of this.
+
+		vaddr = vaddr + PAGE_SIZE;
+	}
+}
+
+static void __init early_set_page_state(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, int op)
+{
+	unsigned long paddr_end;
+	u64 val;
+
+	paddr = paddr & PAGE_MASK;
+	paddr_end = paddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+	while (paddr < paddr_end) {
+		/*
+		 * Use the MSR protocol because this function can be called before the GHCB
+		 * is established.
+		 */
+		sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ_GFN(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, op));
+		VMGEXIT();
+
+		val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
+
+		if (GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP)
From a previous review:

Does that one need a warning too or am I being too paranoid?
+			goto e_term;
+
+		if (WARN(GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val),
+			 "Failed to change page state to '%s' paddr 0x%lx error 0x%llx\n",
+			 op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE ? "private" : "shared",
+			 paddr, GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val)))
+			goto e_term;
+
+		paddr = paddr + PAGE_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	return;
+
+e_term:
+	sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_PSC);
+}
+
+void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
+					 unsigned int npages)
+{
+	if (!sev_feature_enabled(SEV_SNP))
+		return;
+
+	 /* Ask hypervisor to add the memory pages in RMP table as a 'private'. */
	    Ask the hypervisor to mark the memory pages as private in the RMP table.
+	early_set_page_state(paddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE);
+
+	/* Validate the memory pages after they've been added in the RMP table. */
+	pvalidate_pages(vaddr, npages, 1);
+}
+
+void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
+					unsigned int npages)
+{
+	if (!sev_feature_enabled(SEV_SNP))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalidate the memory pages before they are marked shared in the
+	 * RMP table.
+	 */
+	pvalidate_pages(vaddr, npages, 0);
+
+	 /* Ask hypervisor to make the memory pages shared in the RMP table. */
			      mark
+	early_set_page_state(paddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED);
+}
+
+void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, int op)
+{
+	unsigned long vaddr, npages;
+
+	vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr);
+	npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	switch (op) {
+	case MEMORY_PRIVATE: {
+		early_snp_set_memory_private(vaddr, paddr, npages);
+		return;
+	}
+	case MEMORY_SHARED: {
+		early_snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, paddr, npages);
+		return;
+	}
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	WARN(1, "invalid memory op %d\n", op);
A lot easier, diff ontop of your patch:

---
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 7c2cb5300e43..2ad4b5ab3f6c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -65,12 +65,6 @@ extern bool handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs);
 /* RMP page size */
 #define RMP_PG_SIZE_4K			0
 
-/* Memory opertion for snp_prep_memory() */
-enum snp_mem_op {
-	MEMORY_PRIVATE,
-	MEMORY_SHARED
-};
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 extern struct static_key_false sev_es_enable_key;
 extern void __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 2a5dce42af35..991d7964cee9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -662,20 +662,13 @@ void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, int op)
 	vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr);
 	npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 
-	switch (op) {
-	case MEMORY_PRIVATE: {
+	if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE)
 		early_snp_set_memory_private(vaddr, paddr, npages);
-		return;
-	}
-	case MEMORY_SHARED: {
+	else if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED)
 		early_snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, paddr, npages);
-		return;
+	else {
+		WARN(1, "invalid memory page op %d\n", op);
 	}
-	default:
-		break;
-	}
-
-	WARN(1, "invalid memory op %d\n", op);
 }
 
 int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh)
---
 static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
 
+/*
+ * When SNP is active, changes the page state from private to shared before
s/changes/change/
+ * copying the data from the source to destination and restore after the copy.
+ * This is required because the source address is mapped as decrypted by the
+ * caller of the routine.
+ */
+static inline void __init snp_memcpy(void *dst, void *src, size_t sz,
+				     unsigned long paddr, bool decrypt)
+{
+	unsigned long npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	if (!sev_feature_enabled(SEV_SNP) || !decrypt) {
+		memcpy(dst, src, sz);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the paddr needs to be accessed decrypted, mark the page
What do you mean "If" - this is the SNP version of memcpy. Just say:

	/*
	 * With SNP, the page address needs to be ...
	 */
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+	 * shared in the RMP table before copying it.
+	 */
+	early_snp_set_memory_shared((unsigned long)__va(paddr), paddr, npages);
+
+	memcpy(dst, src, sz);
+
+	/* Restore the page state after the memcpy. */
+	early_snp_set_memory_private((unsigned long)__va(paddr), paddr, npages);
+}
+
 /*
  * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the
  * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is
@@ -96,8 +125,8 @@ static void __init __sme_early_enc_dec(resource_size_t paddr,
 		 * Use a temporary buffer, of cache-line multiple size, to
 		 * avoid data corruption as documented in the APM.
 		 */
-		memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len);
-		memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len);
+		snp_memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len, paddr, enc);
+		snp_memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len, paddr, !enc);
 
 		early_memunmap(dst, len);
 		early_memunmap(src, len);
@@ -277,9 +306,23 @@ static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc)
 	else
 		sme_early_decrypt(pa, size);
 
+	/*
+	 * If page is getting mapped decrypted in the page table, then the page state
+	 * change in the RMP table must happen before the page table updates.
+	 */
+	if (!enc)
+		early_snp_set_memory_shared((unsigned long)__va(pa), pa, 1);
Merge the two branches:

	/* Encrypt/decrypt the contents in-place */
        if (enc) {
                sme_early_encrypt(pa, size);
        } else {
                sme_early_decrypt(pa, size);

                /*
                 * On SNP, the page state change in the RMP table must happen
                 * before the page table updates.
                 */
                early_snp_set_memory_shared((unsigned long)__va(pa), pa, 1);
        }

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

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