[PATCH 13/14] x86: fix repeated words in comments
From: Hemanth Selam <hidden>
Date: 2026-09-07 06:58:23
Also in:
lkml
Subsystem:
the rest, x86 architecture (32-bit and 64-bit), x86 entry code, x86 mce infrastructure, x86 mm · Maintainers:
Linus Torvalds, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Tony Luck, Peter Zijlstra
Drop words accidentally written twice, reported by checkpatch.pl as a possible repeated word. Only touches comments, no code changes. Assisted-by: Cursor:claude-opus-5 Signed-off-by: Hemanth Selam <redacted> --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S | 2 +- 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
index a45e1125fc6c..e0cda8bfee77 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_unsafe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) * The original userspace %rsp (RSP-ORIG_RAX(%rsp)) is stored * on the process stack which is not mapped to userspace and * not readable after we SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3. Delay the CR3 - * switch until after after the last reference to the process + * switch until after the last reference to the process * stack. * * %r8/%r9 are zeroed before the sysret, thus safe to clobber.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
index 2235a7477436..da4db3c709e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ static bool is_copy_from_user(struct pt_regs *regs) * check hit. * If we do have a good "m->cs" (or a faked one in the * case we were executing in VM86 mode) we can use it to - * distinguish an exception taken in user from from one + * distinguish an exception taken in user from one * taken in the kernel. */ static noinstr int error_context(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index cb03f5a2b243..0f127a40f2f2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ int pmdp_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, set_pmd(pmdp, entry); /* * We had a write-protection fault here and changed the pmd - * to to more permissive. No need to flush the TLB for that, + * to more permissive. No need to flush the TLB for that, * #PF is architecturally guaranteed to do that and in the * worst-case we'll generate a spurious fault. */
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ int pudp_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, set_pud(pudp, entry); /* * We had a write-protection fault here and changed the pud - * to to more permissive. No need to flush the TLB for that, + * to more permissive. No need to flush the TLB for that, * #PF is architecturally guaranteed to do that and in the * worst-case we'll generate a spurious fault. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
index 14d9c7daf90f..213c5119d919 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_32) /* * Memory encryption is enabled but the SME enable bit for this - * CPU has has not been set. It is safe to set it, so do so. + * CPU has not been set. It is safe to set it, so do so. */ wrmsr .Ldone: