Thread (31 messages) 31 messages, 2 authors, 2025-10-16

Re: [PATCH v21 25/28] riscv: create a config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support

From: Zong Li <hidden>
Date: 2025-10-16 08:30:01
Also in: linux-arch, linux-devicetree, linux-fsdevel, linux-kselftest, linux-mm, linux-riscv, lkml, rust-for-linux

On Thu, Oct 16, 2025 at 2:14 AM Deepak Gupta [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
This patch creates a config for shadow stack support and landing pad instr
support. Shadow stack support and landing instr support can be enabled by
selecting `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`. Selecting `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI` wires
up path to enumerate CPU support and if cpu support exists, kernel will
support cpu assisted user mode cfi.

If CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI is selected, select `ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS`,
`ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK` and DYNAMIC_SIGFRAME for riscv.

Reviewed-by: Zong Li <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <redacted>
---
 arch/riscv/Kconfig                  | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/riscv/configs/hardening.config |  4 ++++
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
index 0c6038dc5dfd..aed033e2b526 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
@@ -1146,6 +1146,27 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE

           If unsure, say N.

+config RISCV_USER_CFI
+       def_bool y
+       bool "riscv userspace control flow integrity"
+       depends on 64BIT && $(cc-option,-mabi=lp64 -march=rv64ima_zicfiss)
+       depends on RISCV_ALTERNATIVE
+       select RISCV_SBI
+       select ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+       select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+       select DYNAMIC_SIGFRAME
+       help
+         Provides CPU assisted control flow integrity to userspace tasks.
+         Control flow integrity is provided by implementing shadow stack for
+         backward edge and indirect branch tracking for forward edge in program.
+         Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
+         return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks.
+         Indirect branch tracking enforces that all indirect branches must land
+         on a landing pad instruction else CPU will fault. This mitigates against
+         JOP / COP attacks. Applications must be enabled to use it, and old user-
+         space does not get protection "for free".
+         default n.
Maybe it is default 'y' instead of 'n'
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+
 endmenu # "Kernel features"

 menu "Boot options"
diff --git a/arch/riscv/configs/hardening.config b/arch/riscv/configs/hardening.config
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..089f4cee82f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/riscv/configs/hardening.config
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# RISCV specific kernel hardening options
+
+# Enable control flow integrity support for usermode.
+CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI=y

--
2.43.0
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