Thread (101 messages) 101 messages, 16 authors, 2022-12-02

Re: [PATCH v9 1/8] mm: Introduce memfd_restricted system call to create restricted user memory

From: Michael Roth <hidden>
Date: 2022-11-29 19:07:22
Also in: kvm, linux-api, linux-arch, linux-fsdevel, linux-mm, lkml, qemu-devel

On Tue, Nov 29, 2022 at 10:06:15PM +0800, Chao Peng wrote:
On Mon, Nov 28, 2022 at 06:37:25PM -0600, Michael Roth wrote:
quoted
On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 11:13:37PM +0800, Chao Peng wrote:
...
quoted
quoted
+static long restrictedmem_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode,
+				    loff_t offset, loff_t len)
+{
+	struct restrictedmem_data *data = file->f_mapping->private_data;
+	struct file *memfd = data->memfd;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) {
+		if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(offset) || !PAGE_ALIGNED(len))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	restrictedmem_notifier_invalidate(data, offset, offset + len, true);
The KVM restrictedmem ops seem to expect pgoff_t, but here we pass
loff_t. For SNP we've made this strange as part of the following patch
and it seems to produce the expected behavior:
That's correct. Thanks.
quoted
  https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fmdroth%2Flinux%2Fcommit%2Fd669c7d3003ff7a7a47e73e8c3b4eeadbd2c4eb6&amp;data=05%7C01%7Cmichael.roth%40amd.com%7C99e80696067a40d42f6e08dad2138556%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C638053278531323330%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=WDj4KxJjhcntBWJUGCjNmMPfZMGQkCSaAo6ElYrGgF0%3D&amp;reserved=0
quoted
+	ret = memfd->f_op->fallocate(memfd, mode, offset, len);
+	restrictedmem_notifier_invalidate(data, offset, offset + len, false);
+	return ret;
+}
+
<snip>
quoted
+int restrictedmem_get_page(struct file *file, pgoff_t offset,
+			   struct page **pagep, int *order)
+{
+	struct restrictedmem_data *data = file->f_mapping->private_data;
+	struct file *memfd = data->memfd;
+	struct page *page;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = shmem_getpage(file_inode(memfd), offset, &page, SGP_WRITE);
This will result in KVM allocating pages that userspace hasn't necessary
fallocate()'d. In the case of SNP we need to get the PFN so we can clean
up the RMP entries when restrictedmem invalidations are issued for a GFN
range.
Yes fallocate() is unnecessary unless someone wants to reserve some
space (e.g. for determination or performance purpose), this matches its
semantics perfectly at:
https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.man7.org%2Flinux%2Fman-pages%2Fman2%2Ffallocate.2.html&amp;data=05%7C01%7Cmichael.roth%40amd.com%7C99e80696067a40d42f6e08dad2138556%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C638053278531323330%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=67sdTY47cM1IBUG2eJCltYF5SyGOpd9%2FVxVlHUw02tU%3D&amp;reserved=0
quoted
If the guest supports lazy-acceptance however, these pages may not have
been faulted in yet, and if the VMM defers actually fallocate()'ing space
until the guest actually tries to issue a shared->private for that GFN
(to support lazy-pinning), then there may never be a need to allocate
pages for these backends.

However, the restrictedmem invalidations are for GFN ranges so there's
no way to know inadvance whether it's been allocated yet or not. The
xarray is one option but currently it defaults to 'private' so that
doesn't help us here. It might if we introduced a 'uninitialized' state
or something along that line instead of just the binary
'shared'/'private' though...
How about if we change the default to 'shared' as we discussed at
https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.kernel.org%2Fall%2FY35gI0L8GMt9%2BOkK%40google.com%2F&amp;data=05%7C01%7Cmichael.roth%40amd.com%7C99e80696067a40d42f6e08dad2138556%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C638053278531323330%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=qzWObDo7ZHW4YjuAjZ5%2B1wEwbqymgBiNM%2BYXiyUSBdI%3D&amp;reserved=0?
Need to look at this a bit more, but I think that could work as well.
quoted
But for now we added a restrictedmem_get_page_noalloc() that uses
SGP_NONE instead of SGP_WRITE to avoid accidentally allocating a bunch
of memory as part of guest shutdown, and a
kvm_restrictedmem_get_pfn_noalloc() variant to go along with that. But
maybe a boolean param is better? Or maybe SGP_NOALLOC is the better
default, and we just propagate an error to userspace if they didn't
fallocate() in advance?
This (making fallocate() a hard requirement) not only complicates the
userspace but also forces the lazy-faulting going through a long path of
exiting to userspace. Unless we don't have other options I would not go
this way.
Unless I'm missing something, it's already the case that userspace is
responsible for handling all the shared->private transitions in response
to KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT or (in our case) KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT. So it only
places the additional requirements on the VMM that if they *don't*
preallocate, then they'll need to issue the fallocate() prior to issuing
the KVM_MEM_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION ioctl in response to these events.

QEMU for example already has a separate 'prealloc' option for cases
where they want to prefault all the guest memory, so it makes sense to
continue making that an optional thing with regard to UPM.

-Mike
Chao
quoted
-Mike
quoted
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	*pagep = page;
+	if (order)
+		*order = thp_order(compound_head(page));
+
+	SetPageUptodate(page);
+	unlock_page(page);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(restrictedmem_get_page);
-- 
2.25.1
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