On 13.03.2020 04:05, Bernd Edlinger wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
On 3/12/20 3:38 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
quoted
Kirill Tkhai [off-list ref] writes:
quoted
On 12.03.2020 15:24, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
quoted
I actually need to switch the lock ordering here, and I haven't yet
because my son was sick yesterday.
All the best wishes to you and your son. I hope he will get well soon.
And sorry for not missing the issue in the review. The reason turns
out that bprm_mm_init is called after prepare_bprm_creds, but there
are error pathes between those where free_bprm is called up with
cred != NULL and mm == NULL, but the mutex not locked.
I figured out a possible fix for the problem that was pointed out:
From ceb6f65b52b3a7f0280f4f20509a1564a439edf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bernd Edlinger <redacted>
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 15:31:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix issues with exec_update_mutex
Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <redacted>
---
fs/exec.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index ffeebb1..cde4937 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1021,8 +1021,14 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
old_mm = current->mm;
exec_mm_release(tsk, old_mm);
- if (old_mm) {
+ if (old_mm)
sync_mm_rss(old_mm);
+
+ ret = mutex_lock_killable(&tsk->signal->exec_update_mutex);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (old_mm) {
/*
* Make sure that if there is a core dump in progress
* for the old mm, we get out and die instead of going@@ -1032,14 +1038,11 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
down_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
if (unlikely(old_mm->core_state)) {
up_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
+ mutex_unlock(&tsk->signal->exec_update_mutex);
return -EINTR;
}
}
- ret = mutex_lock_killable(&tsk->signal->exec_update_mutex);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
task_lock(tsk);
active_mm = tsk->active_mm;
membarrier_exec_mmap(mm);@@ -1444,8 +1447,6 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
free_arg_pages(bprm);
if (bprm->cred) {
- if (!bprm->mm)
- mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->exec_update_mutex);
mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
abort_creds(bprm->cred);
}@@ -1846,6 +1847,8 @@ static int __do_execve_file(int fd, struct filename *filename,
would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
retval = exec_binprm(bprm);
+ if (bprm->cred && !bprm->mm)
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->exec_update_mutex);
Despite this should fix the problem, this looks like a broken puzzle.
We can't use bprm->cred as an identifier whether the mutex was locked or not.
We can check for bprm->cred in regard to cred_guard_mutex, because of there is
strong rule: "cred_guard_mutex is becomes locked together with bprm->cred assignment
(see prepare_bprm_creds()), and it becomes unlocked together with bprm->cred zeroing".
Take attention on modularity of all this: there is no dependencies between anything else.
In regard to newly introduced exec_update_mutex, your fix and source patch way look like
an obfuscation. The mutex becomes deadly glued to unrelated bprm->cred and bprm->mm,
and this introduces the problems in the future modifications and support of all involved
entities. If someone wants to move some functions in relation to each other, there will
be a pain, and this person will have to go again the same dependencies and bug way,
Eric stepped on in the original patch.