On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 9:00 PM Jann Horn [off-list ref] wrote:

On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 8:29 PM Eric W. Biederman [off-list ref] wrote:

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Jann Horn [off-list ref] writes:

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On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 7:54 PM Eric W. Biederman [off-list ref] wrote:

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During exec some file descriptors are closed and the files struct is
unshared.  But all of that can happen at other times and it has the
same protections during exec as at ordinary times.  So stop taking the
cred_guard_mutex as it is useless.

Furthermore he cred_guard_mutex is a bad idea because it is deadlock
prone, as it is held in serveral while waiting possibly indefinitely
for userspace to do something.

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If you make this change, then if this races with execution of a setuid
program that afterwards e.g. opens a unix domain socket, an attacker
will be able to steal that socket and inject messages into
communication with things like DBus. procfs currently has the same
race, and that still needs to be fixed, but at least procfs doesn't
let you open things like sockets because they don't have a working
->open handler, and it enforces the normal permission check for
opening files.

It isn't only exec that can change credentials.  Do we need a lock for
changing credentials?

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If we need a lock around credential change let's design and build that.
Having a mismatch between what a lock is designed to do, and what
people use it for can only result in other bugs as people get confused.

Hmm... what benefits do we get from making it a separate lock? I guess
it would allow us to make it a per-task lock instead of a
signal_struct-wide one? That might be helpful...

But actually, isn't the core purpose of the cred_guard_mutex to guard
against concurrent credential changes anyway? That's what almost
everyone uses it for, and it's in the name...