Re: [RFC PATCH v3 05/24] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
From: Yu-cheng Yu <hidden>
Date: 2018-08-30 22:54:18
Also in:
linux-api, linux-arch, linux-mm, lkml
On Thu, 2018-08-30 at 22:39 +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
Hi!quoted
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txtb/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 9871e649ffef..b090787188b4 100644--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt@@ -2764,6 +2764,12 @@noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default) noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings + no_cet_ibt [X86-64] Disable indirect branch tracking for user-mode + applications + + no_cet_shstk [X86-64] Disable shadow stack support for user-mode + applicationsHmm, not too consistent with "nosmap" below. Would it make sense to have cet=on/off/ibt/shstk instead?quoted
+++ b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ +========================================= +Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) +========================================= + +[1] Overview +============ + +Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) provides protectionagainst +return/jump-oriented programing (ROP) attacks.Can you add something like "It attempts to protect process from running arbitrary code even after attacker has control of its stack" -- for people that don't know what ROP is, and perhaps link to wikipedia explaining ROP or something...quoted
It can be implemented +to protect both the kernel and applications. In the first phase, +only the user-mode protection is implemented for the 64-bit kernel. +Thirty-two bit applications are supported under the compatibility32-bit (for consistency). Ok, so CET stops execution of malicious code before architectural effects are visible, correct? Does it prevent micro-architectural effects of the malicious code? (cache content would be one example; see Spectre).quoted
+[3] Application Enabling +========================"Enabling CET in applications" ?quoted
+Signal +------ + +The main program and its signal handlers use the same SHSTK. Because +the SHSTK stores only return addresses, we can estimate a large +enough SHSTK to cover the condition that both the program stack and +the sigaltstack run out.English? Is it estimate or is it large enough? "a large" -- "a" should be deleted AFAICT.
I will work on these, thanks!