On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 7:41 AM Yu-cheng Yu [off-list ref] wrote:

This patch adds basic shadow stack enabling/disabling routines.
A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK
flag set and read-only protection.  The shadow stack is
allocated to a fixed size and that can be changed by the system
admin.

How do threads work?  Can a user program mremap() its shadow stack to
make it bigger?

Also, did you add all the needed checks to make get_user_pages(),
access_process_vm(), etc fail when called on the shadow stack?  (Or at
least fail if they're requesting write access and the FORCE bit isn't
set.)

+#define SHSTK_SIZE (0x8000 * (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 4 : 8))

Please don't add more mode-dependent #defines.  Also, please try to
avoid adding any new code that looks at TIF_IA32 or similar.  Uses of
that bit are generally bugs, and the bit itself should get removed
some day.  If you need to make a guess, use in_compat_syscall() or
similar if appropriate.

+
+static inline int cet_set_shstk_ptr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+       u64 r;
+
+       if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+               return -1;
+
+       if ((addr >= TASK_SIZE) || (!IS_ALIGNED(addr, 4)))
+               return -1;'

TASK_SIZE_MAX, please.  TASK_SIZE is weird and is usually the wrong
thing to use.

+static unsigned long shstk_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
+{
+       struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+       unsigned long populate;
+
+       down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+       addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, len, PROT_READ,
+                      MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK,
+                      0, &populate, NULL);
+       up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+
+       if (populate)
+               mm_populate(addr, populate);

Please don't populate if do_mmap() failed.

+int cet_setup_shstk(void)
+{
+       unsigned long addr, size;
+
+       if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+               return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+       size = SHSTK_SIZE;
+       addr = shstk_mmap(0, size);
+
+       if (addr >= TASK_SIZE)
+               return -ENOMEM;

Please check the actual value that do_mmap() would return on error.
(IS_ERR, 0, MAP_FAILED -- I don't remember.)

+
+       cet_set_shstk_ptr(addr + size - sizeof(void *));
+       current->thread.cet.shstk_base = addr;
+       current->thread.cet.shstk_size = size;
+       current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 1;
+       return 0;
+}
+
+void cet_disable_shstk(void)
+{
+       u64 r;
+
+       if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+               return;
+
+       rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
+       r &= ~(MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
+       wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
+       wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
+       current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
+}
+
+void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+       if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+           !tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+               return;
+
+       if (tsk == current)
+               cet_disable_shstk();

if tsk != current, then this will malfunction, right?  What is it
intended to do?

+
+       /*
+        * Free only when tsk is current or shares mm
+        * with current but has its own shstk.
+        */
+       if (tsk->mm && (tsk->mm == current->mm) &&
+           (tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base)) {
+               vm_munmap(tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base,
+                         tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size);
+               tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0;
+               tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0;
+       }

I'm having trouble imagining why the kernel would ever want to
automatically free the shadow stack vma.  What is this for?
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