[PATCH RFC v2 11/12] integrity: Do not allow mok keyring updates following init
STALE1884d
From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Date: 2021-07-26 17:15:30
Also in:
keyrings, linux-integrity, linux-security-module, lkml
Subsystem:
extended verification module (evm), integrity measurement architecture (ima), security subsystem, the rest · Maintainers:
Mimi Zohar, Roberto Sassu, Dmitry Kasatkin, Paul Moore, James Morris, "Serge E. Hallyn", Linus Torvalds
Revision v2 of 8 in this series.
Revisions (8)
The mok keyring is setup during init. No additional keys should be allowed to be added afterwards. Leave the permission as read only. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> --- v2: Initial version --- security/integrity/digsig.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index be4860c596b9..3a12cc85b528 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c@@ -145,7 +145,8 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) else restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima; - perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE; + if (id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MOK) + perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE; out: return __integrity_init_keyring(id, perm, restriction);
--
2.18.4