Thread (33 messages) 33 messages, 3 authors, 2021-01-21

Re: [PATCH v3 09/10] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Date: 2021-01-20 05:30:33
Also in: keyrings, linux-integrity, linux-security-module, lkml

On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 04:19:08PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
From: Mickaël Salaün <redacted>

Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring.  This enables to
invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain.  This also enables to
add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.

Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
trusted is a sensitive operation.  This is why adding new hashes to the
blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
vouched by the builtin trusted keyring.  A blacklist hash is stored as a
key description.  The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
provided as the key payload.

Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
is running.  It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.

Update blacklist keyring and blacklist key access rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
  make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update;
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
  root user rights.

See the help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh provided by a
following commit.
Please re-order patches in a way that print-cert-tbs-hash.sh is
available before this. That way we get rid of this useless remark.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <redacted>
/Jarkko
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