Lukas Wunner wrote:

CMA-SPDM state is lost when a device undergoes a Conventional Reset.
(But not a Function Level Reset, PCIe r6.2 sec 6.6.2.)  A D3cold to D0
transition implies a Conventional Reset (PCIe r6.2 sec 5.8).

Thus, reauthenticate devices on resume from D3cold and on recovery from
a Secondary Bus Reset or DPC-induced Hot Reset.

The requirement to reauthenticate devices on resume from system sleep
(and in the future reestablish IDE encryption) is the reason why SPDM

TSM "connect" state also needs to be managed over reset, so stay tuned
for some collaboration here.

needs to be in-kernel:  During ->resume_noirq, which is the first phase
after system sleep, the PCI core walks down the hierarchy, puts each
device in D0, restores its config space and invokes the driver's
->resume_noirq callback.  The driver is afforded the right to access the
device already during this phase.

I agree that CMA should be in kernel, it's not clear that authentication
needs to be automatic, and certainly not in a way that a driver can not
opt-out of.

What if a use case cares about resume time latency?  What if a driver
knows that authentication is only needed later in the resume flow? Seems
presumptious for the core to assume it knows best when authentication
needs to happen.

At a minimum I think pci_cma_reauthenticate() should do something like:

/* not previously authenticated skip authentication */
if (!spdm_state->authenticated)
	return;

...so that spdm capable devices can opt-out of automatic reauthentication.