Yao, Jiewen wrote:

Comment below:

quoted

-----Original Message-----
From: Qinkun Bao <redacted>
Sent: Monday, January 22, 2024 10:13 AM
To: Samuel Ortiz <redacted>; Yao, Jiewen <redacted>;
Lu, Ken [off-list ref]
Cc: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
[off-list ref]; Williams, Dan J
[off-list ref]; linux-coco@lists.linux.dev; linux-
kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/4] tsm: Allow for mapping RTMRs to TCG TPM PCRs

quoted

On Jan 21, 2024, at 8:31 AM, Samuel Ortiz [off-list ref] wrote:

On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 07:35:30PM -0800, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan

wrote:

quoted

quoted

On 1/16/24 5:24 PM, Dan Williams wrote:

quoted

Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan wrote:

quoted

On 1/14/24 2:35 PM, Samuel Ortiz wrote:

quoted

Many user space and internal kernel subsystems (e.g. the Linux IMA)
expect a Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) that allows for extending
and reading measurement registers that are compatible with the TCG TPM
PCRs layout, e.g. a TPM. In order to allow those components to
alternatively use a platform TSM as their RTS, a TVM could map the
available RTMRs to one or more TCG TPM PCRs. Once configured, those

PCR

quoted

quoted

quoted

quoted

quoted

to RTMR mappings give the kernel TSM layer all the necessary information
to be a RTS for e.g. the Linux IMA or any other components that expects
a TCG compliant TPM PCRs layout.

TPM PCR mappings are configured through configfs:

// Create and configure 2 RTMRs
mkdir /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr0
mkdir /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr1
echo 0 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr0/index
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr1/index

// Map RTMR 0 to PCRs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8
echo 4-8 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr0/tcg_map

// Map RTMR 1 to PCRs 16, 17 and 18
echo 16-18 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr1/tcg_map

Any information on how this mapping will be used by TPM or IMA ?

RTMR to PCR mapping is fixed by design, right? If yes, why allow
user to configure it. We can let vendor drivers to configure it, right?

I assume the "vendor driver", that publishes the RTMR to the tsm-core,
has no idea whether they will be used for PCR emulation, or not. The TPM
proxy layer sitting on top of this would know the mapping of which RTMRs
are recording a transcript of which PCR extend events.

My thinking is, since this mapping is ARCH-specific information
and fixed by design, it makes more sense to hide this detail in the
vendor driver than letting userspace configure it. If we allow users to
configure it, there is a chance for incorrect mapping.

I think I agree with the fact that letting users configure that mapping
may be error prone. But I'm not sure this is an architecture specific
mapping, but rather a platform specific one. I'd expect the guest firmware
to provide it through e.g. the MapPcrToMrIndex EFI CC protocol.

So I agree I should remove the user interface for setting that mapping,
and pass it from the provider capabilities instead. It is then up to the
provider to choose how it'd build that information (hard coded, from
EFI, etc).

The UEFI specification has defined the mapping relationship between the
TDX RTMR and TPM PCRs (See
https://uefi.org/specs/UEFI/2.10/38_Confidential_Computing.html#intel-trust-
domain-extension). The current RTMR implementation in the boot loader
is “hooked” in the implementation for the TPM.

When the bootloader needs to extend the PCR value, it calls
`map_pcr_to_mr_index`  to retrieve the corresponding RTMR index and
then extends the RTMR. Considering this behavior, I don’t think we should
allow users to configure the mappings between the PCR and RTMR. (See
https://github.com/rhboot/shim/pull/485/files).

Add Jiewen (owner of the RTMR changes in the firmware) and Ken (
owner of the RTMR changes in the boot loader) for the visibility.

I think the mapping should be static and determined by the hardware architecture.

Allowing user to configure the mapping just adds complexity and
confusing. For example, the user must understand clearly on what is
Intel-TDX/AMD-SEV/ARM-CCA/RISCV-CoVE, how many registers they have,
what is the best way to map it.

It also adds complexity to the verifier. For example, the verifier
must understand how a user configure the mapping, then get the
expected measurement register value.

I agree with this, what I have a problem with is that this:

https://uefi.org/specs/UEFI/2.10/38_Confidential_Computing.html#intel-trust-domain-extension

...is vendor specific, especially when the kernel enabling is being
targeted as cross-vendor.

So, yes, the mapping should be allowed to specified by the low-level
driver, but at the same time every vendor should not reinvent their own
enumeration method when we have EFI for that.

In other words Linux should enforce unification across vendors and
consider waiting until the RTMR enumeration is promoted out of the
vendor specific section to a cross vendor standard.