Thread (133 messages) 133 messages, 19 authors, 2022-12-01

Re: [PATCHv7 00/14] mm, x86/cc: Implement support for unaccepted memory

From: Peter Gonda <hidden>
Date: 2022-06-24 18:05:58
Also in: linux-efi, linux-mm, lkml

On Fri, Jun 24, 2022 at 11:41 AM Michael Roth [off-list ref] wrote:
On Fri, Jun 24, 2022 at 10:37:10AM -0600, Peter Gonda wrote:
quoted
On Tue, Jun 14, 2022 at 6:03 AM Kirill A. Shutemov
[off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
UEFI Specification version 2.9 introduces the concept of memory
acceptance: some Virtual Machine platforms, such as Intel TDX or AMD
SEV-SNP, requiring memory to be accepted before it can be used by the
guest. Accepting happens via a protocol specific for the Virtual
Machine platform.

Accepting memory is costly and it makes VMM allocate memory for the
accepted guest physical address range. It's better to postpone memory
acceptance until memory is needed. It lowers boot time and reduces
memory overhead.

The kernel needs to know what memory has been accepted. Firmware
communicates this information via memory map: a new memory type --
EFI_UNACCEPTED_MEMORY -- indicates such memory.

Range-based tracking works fine for firmware, but it gets bulky for
the kernel: e820 has to be modified on every page acceptance. It leads
to table fragmentation, but there's a limited number of entries in the
e820 table

Another option is to mark such memory as usable in e820 and track if the
range has been accepted in a bitmap. One bit in the bitmap represents
2MiB in the address space: one 4k page is enough to track 64GiB or
physical address space.

In the worst-case scenario -- a huge hole in the middle of the
address space -- It needs 256MiB to handle 4PiB of the address
space.

Any unaccepted memory that is not aligned to 2M gets accepted upfront.

The approach lowers boot time substantially. Boot to shell is ~2.5x
faster for 4G TDX VM and ~4x faster for 64G.

TDX-specific code isolated from the core of unaccepted memory support. It
supposed to help to plug-in different implementation of unaccepted memory
such as SEV-SNP.

The tree can be found here:

https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fintel%2Ftdx.git&amp;data=05%7C01%7Cmichael.roth%40amd.com%7C73bacba017c84291482a08da55ffd481%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637916854542432349%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=P%2FUJOL305xo85NLXGxGouQVGHgzLJpmBdNyZ7Re5%2FB0%3D&amp;reserved=0 guest-unaccepted-memory
Hi Kirill,

I have a couple questions about this feature mainly about how cloud
customers can use this, I assume since this is a confidential compute
feature a large number of the users of these patches will be cloud
customers using TDX and SNP. One issue I see with these patches is how
do we as a cloud provider know whether a customer's linux image
supports this feature, if the image doesn't have these patches UEFI
needs to fully validate the memory, if the image does we can use this
new protocol. In GCE we supply our VMs with a version of the EDK2 FW
and the customer doesn't input into which UEFI we run, as far as I can
tell from the Azure SNP VM documentation it seems very similar. We
need to somehow tell our UEFI in the VM what to do based on the image.
The current way I can see to solve this issue would be to have our
customers give us metadata about their VM's image but this seems kinda
burdensome on our customers (I assume we'll have more features which
both UEFI and kernel need to both support inorder to be turned on like
this one) and error-prone, if a customer incorrectly labels their
quoted
image it may fail to boot.. Has there been any discussion about how to
solve this? My naive thoughts were what if UEFI and Kernel had some
sort of feature negotiation. Maybe that could happen via an extension
to exit boot services or a UEFI runtime driver, I'm not sure what's
best here just some ideas.
Not sure if you've seen this thread or not, but there's also been some
discussion around this in the context of the UEFI support:

  https://patchew.org/EDK2/cover.1654420875.git.min.m.xu@intel.com/cce5ea2aaaeddd9ce9df6fa7ac1ef52976c5c7e6.1654420876.git.min.m.xu@intel.com/#20220608061805.vvsjiqt55rqnl3fw@sirius.home.kraxel.org

2 things being discussed there really, which I think roughly boil down
to:

 1) how to configure OVMF to enable/disable lazy acceptance
    - compile time option most likely: accept-all/accept-minimum/accept-1GB

 2) how to introduce an automatic mode in the future where OVMF does the
    right thing based on what the guest supports. Gerd floated the idea of
    tying it to ExitBootServices as well, but not sure there's a solid
    plan on what to do here yet.

If that's accurate, it seems like the only 'safe' option is to disable it via
#1 (accept-all), and then when #2 comes along, compile OVMF to just Do The
Right Thing.

Users who know their VMs implement lazy acceptance can force it on via
accept-all OVMF compile option.
Thanks for this Mike! I will bring this to the EDK2 community.

The issue for us is our users use a GCE built EDK2 not their own
compiled version so they don't have the choice. Reading the Azure docs
it seems the same for them, and for AWS so I don't know how often
customers actually get to bring their own firmware.
-Mike
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