On 14/10/2021 16:36, Greg KH wrote:
On Thu, Oct 14, 2021 at 01:08:47PM +0000, Dov Murik wrote:
quoted
When efi-stub copies an EFI-provided confidential computing (coco)
secret area, reserve that memory block for future use within the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <redacted>
---
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 1 +
drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 2 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 4 ++++
include/linux/efi.h | 3 +++
5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
index 147c30a81f15..35e082e5f603 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
&efi.mokvar_table,
#endif
+ &efi.coco_secret,
Shouldn't this depend on CONFIG_EFI_SECRET?
Why build all of this code if that option is not enabled?
Thanks Greg for noticing this. Fixed in v4 [1] where the code
is guarded with #ifdefs (so it's not built by default).
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211020061408.3447533-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ (local)
-Dov