Re: [RFC] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory
From: Kirill A. Shutemov <hidden>
Date: 2021-09-15 14:29:34
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kvm, linux-mm, lkml
On Wed, Sep 15, 2021 at 03:51:25PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
quoted
quoted
diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c index 081dd33e6a61..ae43454789f4 100644 --- a/mm/memfd.c +++ b/mm/memfd.c@@ -130,11 +130,24 @@ static unsigned int *memfd_file_seals_ptr(struct file *file) return NULL; } +int memfd_register_guest(struct inode *inode, void *owner, + const struct guest_ops *guest_ops, + const struct guest_mem_ops **guest_mem_ops) +{ + if (shmem_mapping(inode->i_mapping)) { + return shmem_register_guest(inode, owner, + guest_ops, guest_mem_ops); + } + + return -EINVAL; +}Are we stick our design to memfd interface (e.g other memory backing stores like tmpfs and hugetlbfs will all rely on this memfd interface to interact with KVM), or this is just the initial implementation for PoC?I don't think we are, it still feels like we are in the early prototype phase (even way before a PoC). I'd be happy to see something "cleaner" so to say -- it still feels kind of hacky to me, especially there seem to be many pieces of the big puzzle missing so far. Unfortunately, this series hasn't caught the attention of many -MM people so far, maybe because other people miss the big picture as well and are waiting for a complete design proposal. For example, what's unclear to me: we'll be allocating pages with GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE, making them land on MIGRATE_CMA or ZONE_MOVABLE; then we silently turn them unmovable, which breaks these concepts. Who'd migrate these pages away just like when doing long-term pinning, or how is that supposed to work?
That's fair point. We can fix it by changing mapping->gfp_mask.
Also unclear to me is how refcount and mapcount will be handled to prevent swapping,
refcount and mapcount are unchanged. Pages not pinned per se. Swapping prevented with the change in shmem_writepage().
who will actually do some kind of gfn-epfn etc. mapping, how we'll forbid access to this memory e.g., via /proc/kcore or when dumping memory
It's not aimed to prevent root to shoot into his leg. Root do root.
... and how it would ever work with migration/swapping/rmap (it's clearly future work, but it's been raised that this would be the way to make it work, I don't quite see how it would all come together).
Given that hardware supports it migration and swapping can be implemented by providing new callbacks in guest_ops. Like ->migrate_page would transfer encrypted data between pages and ->swapout would provide encrypted blob that can be put on disk or handled back to ->swapin to bring back to memory. -- Kirill A. Shutemov