Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] loop: use task_work for autoclear operation
From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Date: 2022-01-14 16:21:17
On Fri 14-01-22 20:05:31, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
On 2022/01/14 0:23, Jan Kara wrote:quoted
Well, we cannot guarantee what will be state of the loop device when you open it but I think we should guarantee that once you have loop device open, it will not be torn down under your hands. And now that I have realized there are those lo_state checks, I think everything is fine in that regard. I wanted to make sure that sequence such as:Well, we could abort __loop_clr_fd() if somebody called "open()", something like below. But ----------------------------------------diff --git a/drivers/block/loop.c b/drivers/block/loop.c index b1b05c45c07c..960db2c484ab 100644 --- a/drivers/block/loop.c +++ b/drivers/block/loop.c@@ -1082,7 +1082,7 @@ static int loop_configure(struct loop_device *lo, fmode_t mode, return error; } -static void __loop_clr_fd(struct loop_device *lo) +static bool __loop_clr_fd(struct loop_device *lo, int expected_refcnt) { struct file *filp; gfp_t gfp = lo->old_gfp_mask;@@ -1104,9 +1104,19 @@ static void __loop_clr_fd(struct loop_device *lo) * Since this function is called upon "ioctl(LOOP_CLR_FD)" xor "close() * after ioctl(LOOP_CLR_FD)", it is a sign of something going wrong if * lo->lo_state has changed while waiting for lo->lo_mutex. + * + * However, if somebody called "open()" after lo->lo_state became + * Lo_rundown, we should abort rundown in order to avoid unexpected + * I/O error. */ mutex_lock(&lo->lo_mutex); BUG_ON(lo->lo_state != Lo_rundown); + if (atomic_read(&lo->lo_refcnt) != expected_refcnt) { + lo->lo_state = Lo_bound; + lo->lo_flags |= LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR; + mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_mutex); + return false; + } mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_mutex);
Yeah, but as I wrote in my email, I don't think this is needed anymore (and I even think it would be counterproductive). There can be new opens happening before __loop_clr_fd() but any ioctl querying loop device state will return error due to lo->lo_state == Lo_rundown. So from userspace POV the loop device is already invalidated.
quoted
Currently, we may hold both. With your async patch we hold only lo_mutex. Now that I better understand the nature of the deadlock, I agree that holding either still creates the deadlock possibility because both are acquired on loop device open. But now that I reminded myself the lo_state handling, I think the following should be safe in __loop_clr_fd: /* Just a safety check... */ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(data_race(lo->lo_state) != Lo_rundown)) return -ENXIO;this is still racy, for somebody can reach lo_open() right after this check.
Yes, somebody can open but he cannot change lo->lo_state. Also this should be just a safety check. We should never reach __loop_clr_fd() with different lo_state.
Anyway, since the problem that umount() immediately after close() (reported by kernel test robot) remains, we need to make sure that __loop_clr_fd() completes before close() returns to user mode.
I agree with this. But using task_work for __loop_clr_fd() is enough for that. I was just arguing that we don't need extra waiting in lo_open(). Honza -- Jan Kara [off-list ref] SUSE Labs, CR