Re: [PATCH v4 5/9] ufshcd: handle error from blk_ksm_register()
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Date: 2021-07-23 17:13:32
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On Tue, Jul 06, 2021 at 10:29:39PM -0700, Satya Tangirala wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
From: Satya Tangirala <redacted> Handle any error from blk_ksm_register() in the callers. Previously, the callers ignored the return value because blk_ksm_register() wouldn't fail as long as the request_queue didn't have integrity support too, but as this is no longer the case, it's safer for the callers to just handle the return value appropriately. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <redacted> --- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c index d70cdcd35e43..0fcf9d6752f8 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c@@ -233,6 +233,15 @@ void ufshcd_init_crypto(struct ufs_hba *hba) void ufshcd_crypto_setup_rq_keyslot_manager(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct request_queue *q) { - if (hba->caps & UFSHCD_CAP_CRYPTO) - blk_ksm_register(&hba->ksm, q); + if (hba->caps & UFSHCD_CAP_CRYPTO) { + /* + * This WARN_ON should never trigger since &hba->ksm won't be + * "empty" (i.e. will support at least 1 crypto capability), a + * UFS device's request queue doesn't support integrity, and + * it also satisfies all the block layer constraints (i.e. + * supports SG gaps, doesn't have chunk sectors, has a + * sufficiently large supported max_segments per bio) + */ + WARN_ON(!blk_ksm_register(&hba->ksm, q)); + }
I guess this looks okay, but I think the comment should be a bit more concise
and not so tied to the current implementation details, like:
/*
* This WARN_ON should never trigger since at least one of the
* declared crypto capabilities should be compatible with the
* UFS device, otherwise the UFS host driver shouldn't have
* declared crypto support at all.
*/
Likewise for the similar MMC crypto patch.
- Eric