Re: [PATCH v7 2/9] block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Date: 2020-02-21 17:22:07
Also in:
linux-ext4, linux-f2fs-devel, linux-fscrypt, linux-fsdevel, linux-scsi
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
index bf62c25cde8f..bce563031e7c 100644--- a/block/bio-integrity.c +++ b/block/bio-integrity.c@@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ struct bio_integrity_payload *bio_integrity_alloc(struct bio *bio, struct bio_set *bs = bio->bi_pool; unsigned inline_vecs; + if (bio_has_crypt_ctx(bio)) { + pr_warn("blk-integrity can't be used together with blk-crypto en/decryption."); + return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); + }
What is the rationale for this limitation? Restricting unrelated features from being used together is a pretty bad design pattern and should be avoided where possible. If it can't it needs to be documented very clearly.
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION + rq->rq_crypt_ctx.keyslot = -EINVAL; +#endif
All the other core block calls to the crypto code are in helpers that are stubbed out. It might make sense to follow that style here.
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free_and_out:@@ -1813,5 +1826,8 @@ int __init blk_dev_init(void) blk_debugfs_root = debugfs_create_dir("block", NULL); #endif + if (bio_crypt_ctx_init() < 0) + panic("Failed to allocate mem for bio crypt ctxs\n");
Maybe move that panic into bio_crypt_ctx_init itself?
+static int num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs = 128; + +module_param(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs, int, 0444); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs, + "Number of bio crypto contexts to preallocate");
Please write a comment why this is a tunable, how the default is choosen and why someone might want to chane it.
+struct bio_crypt_ctx *bio_crypt_alloc_ctx(gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+ return mempool_alloc(bio_crypt_ctx_pool, gfp_mask);
+}I'd rather move bio_crypt_set_ctx out of line, at which point we don't really need this helper.
+/* Return: 0 on success, negative on error */
+int rq_crypt_ctx_acquire_keyslot(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc,
+ struct keyslot_manager *ksm,
+ struct rq_crypt_ctx *rc)
+{
+ rc->keyslot = blk_ksm_get_slot_for_key(ksm, bc->bc_key);
+ return rc->keyslot >= 0 ? 0 : rc->keyslot;
+}
+
+void rq_crypt_ctx_release_keyslot(struct keyslot_manager *ksm,
+ struct rq_crypt_ctx *rc)
+{
+ if (rc->keyslot >= 0)
+ blk_ksm_put_slot(ksm, rc->keyslot);
+ rc->keyslot = -EINVAL;
+}Is there really much of a need for these helpers? I think the callers would generally be simpler without them. Especially the fallback code can avoid having to declare rq_crypt_ctx variables on stack without the helpers.
+int blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq, struct request_queue *q, + struct bio *bio)
We can always derive the request_queue from rq->q, so there is no need to pass it explicitly (even if a lot of legacy block code does, but it is slowly getting cleaned up).
+{
+ struct rq_crypt_ctx *rc = &rq->rq_crypt_ctx;
+ struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc;
+ int err;
+
+ rc->bc = NULL;
+ rc->keyslot = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!bio)
+ return 0;
+
+ bc = bio->bi_crypt_context;
+ if (!bc)
+ return 0;
Shouldn't the checks if the bio actually requires crypto handling be
done by the caller based on a new handler ala:
static inline bool bio_is_encrypted(struct bio *bio)
{
return bio && bio->bi_crypt_context;
}
and maybe some inline helpers to reduce the clutter?
That way a kernel with blk crypto support, but using non-crypto I/O
saves all the function calls to blk-crypto.
+ err = bio_crypt_check_alignment(bio); + if (err) + goto fail;
This seems pretty late to check the alignment, it would be more useful in bio_add_page. Then again Jens didn't like alignment checks in the block layer at all even for the normal non-crypto alignment, so I don't see why we'd have them here but not for the general case (I'd actually like to ee them for the general case, btw).
+int blk_crypto_evict_key(struct request_queue *q,
+ const struct blk_crypto_key *key)
+{
+ if (q->ksm && blk_ksm_crypto_mode_supported(q->ksm, key))
+ return blk_ksm_evict_key(q->ksm, key);
+
+ return 0;
+}Is there any point in this wrapper that just has a single caller? Als why doesn't blk_ksm_evict_key have the blk_ksm_crypto_mode_supported sanity check itself?
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
@@ -1998,6 +2007,13 @@ static blk_qc_t blk_mq_make_request(struct request_queue *q, struct bio *bio) cookie = request_to_qc_t(data.hctx, rq); + if (blk_crypto_init_request(rq, q, bio)) { + bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE; + bio_endio(bio); + blk_mq_end_request(rq, BLK_STS_RESOURCE); + return BLK_QC_T_NONE; + }
This looks fundamentally wrong given that layers above blk-mq can't handle BLK_STS_RESOURCE. It will just show up as an error in the calller insteaf of being requeued. That being said I think the only error return from blk_crypto_init_request is and actual hardware error. So failing this might be ok, but it should be BLK_STS_IOERR, or even better an error directly propagated from the driver.
+int bio_crypt_ctx_init(void); + +struct bio_crypt_ctx *bio_crypt_alloc_ctx(gfp_t gfp_mask); + +void bio_crypt_free_ctx(struct bio *bio);
These can go into block layer internal headers.
+static inline bool bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(const struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc,
+ unsigned int bytes,
+ u64 next_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE])
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ unsigned int inc = bytes >> bc->bc_key->data_unit_size_bits;
+
+ while (i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE) {
+ if (bc->bc_dun[i] + inc != next_dun[i])
+ return false;
+ inc = ((bc->bc_dun[i] + inc) < inc);
+ i++;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static inline void bio_crypt_dun_increment(u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE],
+ unsigned int inc)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+
+ while (inc && i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE) {
+ dun[i] += inc;
+ inc = (dun[i] < inc);
+ i++;
+ }
+}Should these really be inline?
+bool bio_crypt_rq_ctx_compatible(struct request *rq, struct bio *bio); + +bool bio_crypt_ctx_front_mergeable(struct request *req, struct bio *bio); + +bool bio_crypt_ctx_back_mergeable(struct request *req, struct bio *bio); + +bool bio_crypt_ctx_merge_rq(struct request *req, struct request *next); + +void blk_crypto_bio_back_merge(struct request *req, struct bio *bio); + +void blk_crypto_bio_front_merge(struct request *req, struct bio *bio); + +void blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq); + +int blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq, struct request_queue *q, + struct bio *bio); + +int blk_crypto_bio_prep(struct bio **bio_ptr); + +void blk_crypto_rq_bio_prep(struct request *rq, struct bio *bio); + +void blk_crypto_rq_prep_clone(struct request *dst, struct request *src); + +int blk_crypto_insert_cloned_request(struct request_queue *q, + struct request *rq); + +int blk_crypto_init_key(struct blk_crypto_key *blk_key, const u8 *raw_key, + enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode, + unsigned int blk_crypto_dun_bytes, + unsigned int data_unit_size); + +int blk_crypto_evict_key(struct request_queue *q, + const struct blk_crypto_key *key);
Most of this should be block layer private.
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+struct rq_crypt_ctx { + struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc; + int keyslot; +}; + /* * Try to put the fields that are referenced together in the same cacheline. *@@ -224,6 +230,10 @@ struct request { unsigned short nr_integrity_segments; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION + struct rq_crypt_ctx rq_crypt_ctx; +#endif
I'd be tempted to just add struct bio_crypt_ctx *crypt_ctx; int crypt_keyslot; directly to struct request.