[PATCH v4 09/18] KVM: arm64: Implement HVC handling for protected guests at EL2
WARM1d
From: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
Date: 2026-10-01 13:58:20
Also in:
kvmarm, lkml
Subsystem:
arm64 port (aarch64 architecture), kernel virtual machine for arm64 (kvm/arm64), the rest · Maintainers:
Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Marc Zyngier, Oliver Upton, Linus Torvalds
Revision v4 of 4 in this series.
Revisions (4)
- v1 [diff vs current]
- v2 [diff vs current]
- v3 [diff vs current]
- v4 current
Extend kvm_handle_pvm_hvc64() to handle SMCCC_VERSION, SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES and the vendor hypervisor call UID at EL2, so these queries don't reach the host. ARCH_FEATURES is mandatory from SMCCC 1.1, the version EL2 implements: it returns SUCCESS for itself and for SMCCC_VERSION, NOT_SUPPORTED for anything else, and handles the ARCH_WORKAROUND_1/2/3 queries as the host does, from a copy of the host's mitigation state taken at init with the sanitised ID registers. The workaround calls themselves are already handled on hyp entry. Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h | 4 ++ arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 4 ++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 76 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h
index 4974492744cc8..7609c78c68f34 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/kvm_host.h> #include <asm/alternative.h> +#include <asm/spectre.h> #include <asm/sysreg.h> DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_cpu_context, kvm_hyp_ctxt);
@@ -150,6 +151,9 @@ extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64smfr0_el1_sys_val); extern unsigned long kvm_nvhe_sym(__icache_flags); extern unsigned int kvm_nvhe_sym(kvm_arm_vmid_bits); +extern enum mitigation_state kvm_nvhe_sym(spectre_v2_state); +extern enum mitigation_state kvm_nvhe_sym(spectre_v4_state); +extern enum mitigation_state kvm_nvhe_sym(spectre_bhb_state); extern unsigned int kvm_nvhe_sym(kvm_host_sve_max_vl); extern unsigned long kvm_nvhe_sym(hyp_nr_cpus); extern unsigned int kvm_nvhe_sym(hyp_gicv3_nr_lr);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
index db36815630790..cceeeee266902 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c@@ -2622,6 +2622,10 @@ static void kvm_hyp_init_symbols(void) kvm_nvhe_sym(__icache_flags) = __icache_flags; kvm_nvhe_sym(kvm_arm_vmid_bits) = kvm_arm_vmid_bits; + kvm_nvhe_sym(spectre_v2_state) = arm64_get_spectre_v2_state(); + kvm_nvhe_sym(spectre_v4_state) = arm64_get_spectre_v4_state(); + kvm_nvhe_sym(spectre_bhb_state) = arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(); + /* Propagate the FGT state to the nVHE side */ kvm_nvhe_sym(hfgrtr_masks) = hfgrtr_masks; kvm_nvhe_sym(hfgwtr_masks) = hfgwtr_masks;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
index 6ff08d195ff56..10ff2ba6c6c1b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c@@ -10,12 +10,18 @@ #include <linux/mm.h> #include <asm/kvm_emulate.h> +#include <asm/spectre.h> #include <nvhe/mem_protect.h> #include <nvhe/memory.h> #include <nvhe/pkvm.h> #include <nvhe/trap_handler.h> +/* The host's Spectre mitigation state, for SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES. */ +enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_state; +enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_state; +enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_state; + /* Used by icache_is_aliasing(). */ unsigned long __icache_flags;
@@ -1181,8 +1187,70 @@ bool kvm_handle_pvm_hvc64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code) { u64 val[4] = { SMCCC_RET_INVALID_PARAMETER }; bool handled = true; + u32 feature; + uuid_t uuid; switch (smccc_get_function(vcpu)) { + case ARM_SMCCC_VERSION_FUNC_ID: + /* Nothing to be handled by the host. Go back to the guest. */ + val[0] = ARM_SMCCC_VERSION_1_1; + break; + case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID: + /* The workaround calls themselves are handled on hyp entry. */ + val[0] = SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED; + feature = smccc_get_arg1(vcpu); + switch (feature) { + case ARM_SMCCC_VERSION_FUNC_ID: + case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID: + val[0] = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS; + break; + case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1: + switch (spectre_v2_state) { + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: + break; + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: + val[0] = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS; + break; + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: + val[0] = SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED; + break; + } + break; + case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2: + switch (spectre_v4_state) { + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: + break; + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: + /* With SSBS advertised the guest's default is safe. */ + if (kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, SSBS, IMP)) + break; + fallthrough; + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: + val[0] = SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED; + break; + } + break; + case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3: + switch (spectre_bhb_state) { + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: + break; + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: + val[0] = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS; + break; + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: + val[0] = SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED; + break; + } + break; + } + break; + case ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_CALL_UID_FUNC_ID: + uuid = ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_UID_KVM; + val[0] = smccc_uuid_to_reg(&uuid, 0); + val[1] = smccc_uuid_to_reg(&uuid, 1); + val[2] = smccc_uuid_to_reg(&uuid, 2); + val[3] = smccc_uuid_to_reg(&uuid, 3); + break; case ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_FEATURES_FUNC_ID: val[0] = BIT(ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_FEATURES); val[0] |= BIT(ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_HYP_MEMINFO);
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2.39.5