Re: [PATCH v3 26/36] KVM: arm64: Return -EFAULT from VCPU_RUN on access to a poisoned pte
From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Date: 2026-03-20 16:35:54
Also in:
kvmarm
On Thu, 05 Mar 2026 14:43:39 +0000, Will Deacon [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
If a protected vCPU faults on an IPA which appears to be mapped, query the hypervisor to determine whether or not the faulting pte has been poisoned by a forceful reclaim. If the pte has been poisoned, return -EFAULT back to userspace rather than retrying the instruction forever. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mem_protect.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 10 +++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c | 9 ++-- 5 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h index 04a230e906a7..6c79f7504d80 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ enum __kvm_host_smccc_func { __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_unreserve_vm, __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_init_vm, __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_init_vcpu, + __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_vcpu_in_poison_fault, __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_force_reclaim_guest_page, __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_reclaim_dying_guest_page, __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_start_teardown_vm,diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mem_protect.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mem_protect.h index f27b037abaf3..5e6cdafcdd69 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mem_protect.h +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mem_protect.h@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ int __pkvm_hyp_donate_host(u64 pfn, u64 nr_pages); int __pkvm_host_share_ffa(u64 pfn, u64 nr_pages); int __pkvm_host_unshare_ffa(u64 pfn, u64 nr_pages); int __pkvm_host_donate_guest(u64 pfn, u64 gfn, struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *vcpu); +int __pkvm_vcpu_in_poison_fault(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu); int __pkvm_host_force_reclaim_page_guest(phys_addr_t phys); int __pkvm_host_reclaim_page_guest(u64 gfn, struct pkvm_hyp_vm *vm); int __pkvm_host_share_guest(u64 pfn, u64 gfn, u64 nr_pages, struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *vcpu,diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c index 456c83207717..90e3b14fe287 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c@@ -573,6 +573,15 @@ static void handle___pkvm_init_vcpu(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) cpu_reg(host_ctxt, 1) = __pkvm_init_vcpu(handle, host_vcpu, vcpu_hva); } +static void handle___pkvm_vcpu_in_poison_fault(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) +{ + int ret; + struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu = pkvm_get_loaded_hyp_vcpu(); + + ret = hyp_vcpu ? __pkvm_vcpu_in_poison_fault(hyp_vcpu) : -EINVAL; + cpu_reg(host_ctxt, 1) = ret; +} + static void handle___pkvm_force_reclaim_guest_page(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) { DECLARE_REG(phys_addr_t, phys, host_ctxt, 1);@@ -641,6 +650,7 @@ static const hcall_t host_hcall[] = { HANDLE_FUNC(__pkvm_unreserve_vm), HANDLE_FUNC(__pkvm_init_vm), HANDLE_FUNC(__pkvm_init_vcpu), + HANDLE_FUNC(__pkvm_vcpu_in_poison_fault), HANDLE_FUNC(__pkvm_force_reclaim_guest_page), HANDLE_FUNC(__pkvm_reclaim_dying_guest_page), HANDLE_FUNC(__pkvm_start_teardown_vm),diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c index 4ff31947579b..7f705f662c40 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c@@ -890,6 +890,49 @@ static int get_valid_guest_pte(struct pkvm_hyp_vm *vm, u64 ipa, kvm_pte_t *ptep, return 0; } +int __pkvm_vcpu_in_poison_fault(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) +{ + struct pkvm_hyp_vm *vm = pkvm_hyp_vcpu_to_hyp_vm(hyp_vcpu); + kvm_pte_t pte; + s8 level; + u64 ipa; + int ret; + + switch (kvm_vcpu_trap_get_class(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu)) { + case ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW: + case ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW: + if (kvm_vcpu_trap_is_translation_fault(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu)) + break; + fallthrough; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* + * The host has the faulting IPA when it calls us from the guest + * fault handler but we retrieve it ourselves from the FAR so as + * to avoid exposing an "oracle" that could reveal data access + * patterns of the guest after initial donation of its pages. + */ + ipa = kvm_vcpu_get_fault_ipa(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu); + ipa |= kvm_vcpu_get_hfar(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu) & GENMASK(11, 0);
nit: we now have FAR_TO_FIPA_OFFSET() for this.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+ + guest_lock_component(vm); + ret = kvm_pgtable_get_leaf(&vm->pgt, ipa, &pte, &level); + if (ret) + goto unlock; + + if (level != KVM_PGTABLE_LAST_LEVEL) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto unlock; + } + + ret = guest_pte_is_poisoned(pte); +unlock: + guest_unlock_component(vm); + return ret; +} + int __pkvm_host_share_hyp(u64 pfn) { u64 phys = hyp_pfn_to_phys(pfn);diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c index 32294bd21dde..da0a45dab203 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c@@ -417,10 +417,13 @@ int pkvm_pgtable_stage2_map(struct kvm_pgtable *pgt, u64 addr, u64 size, return -EINVAL; /* - * We raced with another vCPU. + * We either raced with another vCPU or the guest PTE + * has been poisoned by an erroneous host access. */ - if (mapping) - return -EAGAIN; + if (mapping) { + ret = kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__pkvm_vcpu_in_poison_fault); + return ret ? -EFAULT : -EAGAIN; + }
I guess this considers that racing against another vcpu is an unlikely situation, because calling back into EL2 and walking the PTs isn't exactly cheap. I wonder if there is a mechanism we could use to directly return this information to the host at the point of the guest fault. The only things I can figure out would require the PTE to be valid (access or permission faults, for example), and that'd break the "full PTE dedicated to annotations"... M. -- Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.