Re: [PATCH v7 09/11] arm64: Enable memory encrypt for Realms
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Date: 2025-02-26 19:03:07
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kvm, kvmarm, linux-coco, lkml
On Wed, Feb 19, 2025 at 02:30:28PM +0000, Steven Price wrote:
On 17/10/2024 14:14, Steven Price wrote:quoted
From: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Use the memory encryption APIs to trigger a RSI call to request a transition between protected memory and shared memory (or vice versa) and updating the kernel's linear map of modified pages to flip the top bit of the IPA. This requires that block mappings are not used in the direct map for realm guests. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <redacted> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Co-developed-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> ---[...]quoted
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c index 547a9e0b46c2..6ae6ae806454 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c@@ -5,10 +5,12 @@ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h> +#include <asm/pgtable-prot.h> #include <asm/set_memory.h> #include <asm/tlbflush.h> #include <asm/kfence.h>@@ -23,14 +25,16 @@ bool rodata_full __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED bool can_set_direct_map(void) { /* - * rodata_full and DEBUG_PAGEALLOC require linear map to be - * mapped at page granularity, so that it is possible to + * rodata_full, DEBUG_PAGEALLOC and a Realm guest all require linear + * map to be mapped at page granularity, so that it is possible to * protect/unprotect single pages. * * KFENCE pool requires page-granular mapping if initialized late. + * + * Realms need to make pages shared/protected at page granularity. */ return rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled() || - arm64_kfence_can_set_direct_map(); + arm64_kfence_can_set_direct_map() || is_realm_world(); }Aneesh pointed out that this call to is_realm_world() is now too early since the decision to delay the RSI detection. The upshot is that a realm guest which doesn't have page granularity forced for other reasons will fail to share pages with the host. At the moment I can think of a couple of options: (1) Make rodata_full a requirement for realm guests. CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED is already "default y" so this isn't a big ask. (2) Revisit the idea of detecting when running as a realm guest early. This has the advantage of also "fixing" earlycon (no need to manually specify the shared-alias of an unprotected UART). I'm currently leaning towards (1) because it's the default anyway. But if we're going to need to fix earlycon (or indeed find other similar issues) then (2) would obviously make sense.
I'd go with (1) since the end result is the same even if we implemented (2) - i.e. we still avoid block mappings in realms.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c index ce4778141ec7..48a6ef0f401c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c@@ -126,6 +126,10 @@ void __init arm64_rsi_init(void) return; if (!rsi_version_matches()) return; + if (!can_set_direct_map()) { + pr_err("rodata_full disabled, unable to run as a realm guest. Please enable CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED\n");
It's a bit strange to complain about rodata since, in principle, it doesn't have anything to do with realms. Its only side-effect is that we avoid block kernel mappings. Maybe "cannot set the kernel direct map, consider rodata=full" or something like that. -- Catalin