[RFC PATCH 6/8] cred: Protect live struct cred with kpkeys
From: Kevin Brodsky <hidden>
Date: 2025-02-03 10:28:52
Also in:
linux-hardening, linux-mm, lkml
Subsystem:
credentials, kernel hardening (not covered by other areas), security subsystem, the rest · Maintainers:
Paul Moore, Kees Cook, James Morris, "Serge E. Hallyn", Linus Torvalds
This patch introduces a feature to prevent unintended modifications
of live credentials, by moving them to protected memory when they
are installed via commit_creds(). The protection mechanism is kernel
pkeys (kpkeys): protected memory is mapped with a non-default pkey
and write access is disabled by default. As a result,
task->{cred,real_cred} can only be written to by switching to a
higher kpkeys level.
The kpkeys_hardened_cred feature is enabled by choosing
CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_CRED=y and running on a system supporting
kpkeys.
Credentials are not directly allocated in protected memory, as that
would force all code preparing new credentials to switch kpkeys
level. To avoid such disruption, prepare_creds() and variants still
allocate standard memory. When commit_creds() is called, the
credentials are copied to protected memory, and the temporary object
(in a standard kmalloc slab) is freed.
This approach does not work so transparently when it comes to
override_creds(), because it does not consume the reference: the
object it gets passed cannot be moved. Callers of override_creds()
will need to explicitly call a new protect_creds() helper to move
the credentials to protected memory once they are done preparing
them. Some of these callers use the unmodified output of
prepare_creds(); prepare_protected_creds() is introduced to avoid an
unnecessary copy in such cases. This patch does not handle these
situations, but it does not break them either (credentials installed
by override_creds() will simply be unprotected).
Various helpers need to modify live credentials. To that end,
guard(kpkeys_hardened_cred) is introduced to switch to the kpkeys
level that enables write access to KPKEYS_PKEY_CRED.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <redacted>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 6 ++
kernel/cred.c | 178 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
security/Kconfig.hardening | 13 +++
3 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 0c3c4b16b469..b854adce7462 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/uidgid.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/sched/user.h> +#include <linux/kpkeys.h> struct cred; struct inode;
@@ -162,6 +163,8 @@ extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *); extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *); extern void __init cred_init(void); extern int set_cred_ucounts(struct cred *); +extern struct cred *prepare_protected_creds(void); +extern struct cred *protect_creds(struct cred *); static inline bool cap_ambient_invariant_ok(const struct cred *cred) {
@@ -205,6 +208,7 @@ static inline const struct cred *get_cred_many(const struct cred *cred, int nr) struct cred *nonconst_cred = (struct cred *) cred; if (!cred) return cred; + guard(kpkeys_hardened_cred)(); nonconst_cred->non_rcu = 0; atomic_long_add(nr, &nonconst_cred->usage); return cred;
@@ -229,6 +233,7 @@ static inline const struct cred *get_cred_rcu(const struct cred *cred) struct cred *nonconst_cred = (struct cred *) cred; if (!cred) return NULL; + guard(kpkeys_hardened_cred)(); if (!atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&nonconst_cred->usage)) return NULL; nonconst_cred->non_rcu = 0;
@@ -252,6 +257,7 @@ static inline void put_cred_many(const struct cred *_cred, int nr) struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred; if (cred) { + guard(kpkeys_hardened_cred)(); if (atomic_long_sub_and_test(nr, &cred->usage)) __put_cred(cred); }
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 9676965c0981..81664ffef8f7 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ #include <linux/cn_proc.h> #include <linux/uidgid.h> +#include "../mm/slab.h" + #if 0 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \ printk("[%-5.5s%5u] " FMT "\n", \
@@ -62,6 +64,48 @@ struct cred init_cred = { .ucounts = &init_ucounts, }; +static bool hardened_cred_enabled(void) +{ + return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_CRED) && arch_kpkeys_enabled(); +} + +static bool cred_is_protected(const struct cred *cred) +{ + struct slab *slab; + + slab = virt_to_slab(cred); + if (!slab) + return false; + + return slab->slab_cache->flags & SLAB_SET_PKEY; +} + +static struct cred *alloc_unprotected_creds(gfp_t flags) +{ + if (hardened_cred_enabled()) + return kmalloc(sizeof(struct cred), flags); + else + return kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, flags); +} + +static struct cred *alloc_protected_creds(gfp_t flags) +{ + return kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, flags); +} + +static void free_creds(struct cred *cred) +{ + bool cred_in_jar = true; + + if (hardened_cred_enabled()) + cred_in_jar = cred_is_protected(cred); + + if (cred_in_jar) + kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, cred); + else + kfree(cred); +} + /* * The RCU callback to actually dispose of a set of credentials */
@@ -75,7 +119,8 @@ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %ld\n", cred, atomic_long_read(&cred->usage)); - security_cred_free(cred); + scoped_guard(kpkeys_hardened_cred) + security_cred_free(cred); key_put(cred->session_keyring); key_put(cred->process_keyring); key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
@@ -86,7 +131,7 @@ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) if (cred->ucounts) put_ucounts(cred->ucounts); put_user_ns(cred->user_ns); - kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, cred); + free_creds(cred); } /**
@@ -174,7 +219,7 @@ struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void) { struct cred *new; - new = kmem_cache_zalloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL); + new = alloc_unprotected_creds(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); if (!new) return NULL;
@@ -189,29 +234,10 @@ struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void) return NULL; } -/** - * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification - * - * Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification. A task's creds - * shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to - * prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by - * calling commit_creds(). - * - * Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification. - * - * Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise. - * - * Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up. - */ -struct cred *prepare_creds(void) +static struct cred *__prepare_creds(struct cred *new) { struct task_struct *task = current; const struct cred *old; - struct cred *new; - - new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!new) - return NULL; kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new);
@@ -248,8 +274,57 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void) abort_creds(new); return NULL; } + +/** + * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification + * + * Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification. A task's creds + * shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to + * prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by + * calling commit_creds(). + * + * Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification. + * + * Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise. + * + * Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up. + */ +struct cred *prepare_creds(void) +{ + struct cred *new; + + new = alloc_unprotected_creds(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new) + return NULL; + + return __prepare_creds(new); +} EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds); + +/** + * prepare_protected_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials in protected + * memory + * + * This function is equivalent to protect_creds(prepare_creds()), but avoids + * the copy in prepare_creds() by directly allocating the credentials in + * protected memory. The returned object may only be modified by switching to + * a higher kpkeys level, if kpkeys_hardened_cred is enabled. + */ +struct cred *prepare_protected_creds(void) +{ + struct cred *new; + + new = alloc_protected_creds(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new) + return NULL; + + guard(kpkeys_hardened_cred)(); + + return __prepare_creds(new); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_protected_creds); + /* * Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve() * - The caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex
@@ -309,7 +384,9 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags) return 0; } - new = prepare_creds(); + guard(kpkeys_hardened_cred)(); + + new = prepare_protected_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM;
@@ -400,6 +477,10 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new) BUG_ON(task->cred != old); BUG_ON(atomic_long_read(&new->usage) < 1); + guard(kpkeys_hardened_cred)(); + + new = protect_creds(new); + get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */ /* dumpability changes */
@@ -555,9 +636,16 @@ int set_cred_ucounts(struct cred *new) */ void __init cred_init(void) { + slab_flags_t flags = SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC | SLAB_ACCOUNT; + struct kmem_cache_args args = {}; + + if (hardened_cred_enabled()) { + flags |= SLAB_SET_PKEY; + args.pkey = KPKEYS_PKEY_CRED; + } + /* allocate a slab in which we can store credentials */ - cred_jar = KMEM_CACHE(cred, - SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC | SLAB_ACCOUNT); + cred_jar = kmem_cache_create("cred", sizeof(struct cred), &args, flags); } /**
@@ -584,7 +672,7 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon) if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!daemon)) return NULL; - new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL); + new = alloc_unprotected_creds(GFP_KERNEL); if (!new) return NULL;
@@ -627,6 +715,42 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred); +/** + * protect_creds - Move a set of credentials to protected memory + * @cred: The credentials to protect + * + * If kpkeys_hardened_cred is enabled, this function transfers @cred to + * protected memory. The returned object may only be modified by switching to a + * higher kpkeys level, for instance by using guard(kpkeys_hardened_cred). + * + * Because the credentials are copied to a new location and the old location is + * freed, any exising reference to @cred becomes invalid after this function is + * called. For this reason only the caller should have a reference to @cred. + * + * If any failure occurs, or if kpkeys_hardened_cred is disabled, @cred is + * returned unmodified. + */ +struct cred *protect_creds(struct cred *cred) +{ + struct cred *protected_cred; + + if (!hardened_cred_enabled()) + return cred; + + if (WARN_ON(atomic_long_read(&cred->usage) != 1)) + return cred; + + protected_cred = alloc_protected_creds(GFP_KERNEL); + if (WARN_ON(!protected_cred)) + return cred; + + guard(kpkeys_hardened_cred)(); + + *protected_cred = *cred; + kfree(cred); + return protected_cred; +} + /** * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials * @new: The credentials to alter
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index 649847535fc3..1af3a9dae645 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening@@ -325,6 +325,19 @@ config KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES_TEST If unsure, say N. +config KPKEYS_HARDENED_CRED + bool "Harden task credentials using kernel pkeys" + depends on ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS + select KPKEYS_UNRESTRICTED_RCU + help + This option enforces the immutability of tasks credentials + (struct cred) by allocating them with a non-default protection (pkey) + and only enabling write access to that pkey in a limited set of cred + helpers. + + This option has no effect if the system does not support + kernel pkeys. + endmenu config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT
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2.47.0