Thread (57 messages) read the whole thread 57 messages, 5 authors, 2023-09-27

Re: [PATCH 12/14] media: medkatek: vcodec: set secure mode to decoder driver

From: Jeffrey Kardatzke <hidden>
Date: 2023-09-27 18:31:02
Also in: linux-devicetree, linux-media, linux-mediatek, lkml

Sounds great Hans! I'll work with Mediatek to update their code for that.

On Wed, Sep 27, 2023 at 12:26 AM Hans Verkuil [off-list ref] wrote:
On 26/09/2023 22:59, Jeffrey Kardatzke wrote:
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Hans,

I've been looking through the v4l2/vbuf2 code to get an idea of the
details for implementing a new memory type for secure buffers.  What
it comes down to essentially is that it would behave just like
V4L2_MEMORY_DMABUF, but then there would be an extra check in
__prepare_dmabuf (in videobuf2-core.c) when the memory type is SECURE
to ensure that it is actually from a secure dma-buf allocation.  So
I'm thinking an alternate solution might be cleaner so we don't have
two memory types that are handled nearly identically in most of the
code. What do you think about a new memory flag like
V4L2_MEMORY_FLAG_SECURE?  This would be set in vb2_queue struct like
the other existing memory flag. Then when it gets into
__prepare_dmabuf and invokes attach_dmabuf on each buffer...that call
could then check for the existence of that flag, and if it's there it
could validate it is actually secure memory.  Then in various other
dmabuf vb2_mem_ops (maybe alloc, get_userptr, vaddr and mmap) those
could also check for the secure flag, and if present return an
error/null.  Then also in the driver specific vb2_ops for queue_setup,
the MTK driver could recognize the flag there and then configure
itself for secure mode.

How does that sound as an overall strategy?
Yes, I actually had the same thought.

You would also need a new capability: V4L2_BUF_CAP_SUPPORTS_SECURE_MEMORY

It makes more sense than creating a new V4L2_MEMORY_ type, and it still
is handled at the right place (creating the buffers).

Regards,

        Hans
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Cheers,
Jeff

On Mon, Sep 25, 2023 at 9:51 AM Jeffrey Kardatzke [off-list ref] wrote:
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On Mon, Sep 25, 2023 at 2:00 AM Hans Verkuil [off-list ref] wrote:
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On 22/09/2023 21:17, Jeffrey Kardatzke wrote:
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On Fri, Sep 22, 2023 at 1:44 AM Hans Verkuil [off-list ref] wrote:
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On 22/09/2023 05:28, Yunfei Dong (董云飞) wrote:
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Hi Hans,

Thanks for your help to give some good advice.
On Wed, 2023-09-20 at 09:20 +0200, Hans Verkuil wrote:
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In any case, using a control to switch to secure mode and using
a control
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to convert a dmabuf fd to a secure handle seems a poor choice to
me.
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I was wondering if it wouldn't be better to create a new
V4L2_MEMORY_ type,
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e.g. V4L2_MEMORY_DMABUF_SECURE (or perhaps _DMABUF_OPTEE). That
ensures that
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once you create buffers for the first time, the driver can
switch into secure
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mode, and until all buffers are released again you know that the
driver will
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stay in secure mode.
Why do you think the control for setting secure mode is a poor
choice?
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There's various places in the driver code where functionality
changes
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based on being secure/non-secure mode, so this is very much a
'global'
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setting for the driver. It could be inferred based off a new
memory
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type for the queues...which then sets that flag in the driver;
but
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that seems like it would be more fragile and would require
checking
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for incompatible output/capture memory types. I'm not against
another
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way of doing this; but didn't see why you think the proposed
method is
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a poor choice.
I assume you are either decoding to secure memory all the time, or
not
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at all. That's something you would want to select the moment you
allocate
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the first buffer. Using the V4L2_MEMORY_ value would be the
natural place
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for that. A control can typically be toggled at any time, and it
makes
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no sense to do that for secure streaming.

Related to that: if you pass a dmabuf fd you will need to check
somewhere
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if the fd points to secure memory or not. You don't want to mix
the two
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but you want to check that at VIDIOC_QBUF time.

Note that the V4L2_MEMORY_ value is already checked in the v4l2
core,
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drivers do not need to do that.
Just to clarify a bit, and make sure I understand this too. You are
proposing to
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introduce something like:

   V4L2_MEMORY_SECURE_DMABUF

Which like V4L2_MEMORY_DMABUF is meant to import dmabuf, while
telling the
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driver that the memory is secure according to the definition of
"secure" for the
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platform its running on.

This drivers also allocate secure SHM (a standard tee concept) and
have internal
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allocation for reconstruction buffer and some hw specific reference
metadata. So
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the idea would be that it would keep allocation using the dmabuf
heap internal
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APIs ? And decide which type of memory based on the memory type
found in the
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queue?
Yes. Once you request the first buffer you basically tell the driver
whether it
will operate in secure or non-secure mode, and that stays that way
until all
buffers are freed. I think that makes sense.
According to iommu's information, the dma operation for secure and non-
secure are the same, whether just need to add one memory type in v4l2
framework the same as V4L2_MEMORY_DMABUF? The dma operation in
videobuf2-dma-contig.c can use the same functions.
So if I pass a non-secure dma fd to the capture queue of the codec, who
will check that it can't write the data to that fd? Since doing so would
expose the video. Presumably at some point the tee code will prevent that?
(I sincerely hope so!)
It is entirely the job of the TEE to prevent this. Nothing in the
kernel should allow exploitation of what happens in the TEE no matter
what goes on in the kernel
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Having a separate V4L2_MEMORY_DMABUF_SECURE type is to indicate to the
driver that 1) it can expect secure dmabuf fds, 2) it can configure itself
for that (that avoids using a control to toggle between normal and secure mode),
and at VIDIOC_QBUF time it is easy for the V4L2 core to verify that the
fd that is passed in is for secure memory. This means that mistakes by
userspace are caught at QBUF time.

Of course, this will not protect you (people can disable this check by
recompiling the kernel), that still has to be done by the firmware, but
it catches userspace errors early on.

Also, while for this hardware the DMA operation is the same, that might
not be the case for other hardware.
That's a really good point. So one of the other models that is used
for secure video decoding is to send the encrypted buffer into the
video decoder directly (i.e. V4L2_MEMORY_MMAP) and then also send in
all the corresponding crypto parameters (i.e. algorithm, IV,
encryption pattern, etc.). Then the video driver internally does the
decryption and decode in one operation.  That's not what we want to
use here for Mediatek; but I've done other integrations that work that
way (that was for VAAPI [1], not V4L2...but there are other ARM
implementations that do operate that way).  So if we end up requiring
V4L2_MEMORY_DMABUF_SECURE to indicate secure mode and enforce it on
output+capture, that'll close off other potential solutions in the
future.

Expanding on your point about DMA operations being different on
various hardware, that also makes me think a general check for this in
v4l2 code may also be limiting. There are various ways secure video
pipelines are done, so leaving these checks up to the individual
drivers that implement secure video decode may be more pragmatic. If
there's a generic V4L2 _CID_SECURE_MODE control, that makes it more
general for how drivers can handle secure video decode.
No, using a control for this is really wrong.

The reason why I want it as a separate memory type is that that is
what you use when you call VIDIOC_REQBUFS, and that ioctl is also
when things are locked down in a driver. As long as no buffers have
been allocated, you can still change formats, parameters, etc. But
once buffers are allocated, most of that can't be changed, since
changing e.g. the format would also change the buffer sizes.

It also locks down who owns the buffers by storing the file descriptor.
This prevents other processes from hijacking the I/O streaming, only
the owner can stream buffers.

So it is a natural point in the sequence for selecting secure
buffers.

If you request V4L2_MEMORY_DMABUF_SECURE for the output, then the
capture side must also use DMABUF_SECURE. Whether or not you can
use regular DMABUF for the output side and select DMABUF_SECURE
on the capture side is a driver decision. It can be useful to
support this for testing the secure capture using regular video
streams (something Nicolas discussed as well), but it depends on
the hardware whether you can use that technique.
OK, that does work for the additional cases I mentioned.  And for
testing...we would still want to use DMABUF_SECURE on both ends for
Mediatek at least (that's the only way they support it). But rather
than having to bother with a clearkey implementation...we can just do
something that directly copies compressed video into the secure
dmabufs and then exercises the whole pipeline from there. This same
thing happens with the 'clear lead' that is sometimes there with
encrypted video (where the first X seconds are unencrypted and then it
switches to encrypted...but you're still using the secure video
pipeline on the unencrypted frames in that case).

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Regards,

        Hans
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[1] - https://github.com/intel/libva/blob/master/va/va.h#L2177
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Regards,

        Hans
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Best Regards,
Yunfei Dong
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