Re: KVM/arm64: Guest ABI changes do not appear rollback-safe
From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Date: 2021-08-25 10:49:26
Also in:
kvm, kvmarm
On Wed, 25 Aug 2021 11:02:28 +0100, Oliver Upton [off-list ref] wrote:
On Wed, Aug 25, 2021 at 2:27 AM Marc Zyngier [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
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Exposing new hypercalls to guests in this manner seems very unsafe to me. Suppose an operator is trying to upgrade from kernel N to kernel N+1, which brings in the new 'widget' hypercall. Guests are live migrated onto the N+1 kernel, but the operator finds a defect that warrants a kernel rollback. VMs are then migrated from kernel N+1 -> N. Any guests that discovered the 'widget' hypercall are likely going to get fussy _very_ quickly on the old kernel.This goes against what we decided to support for the *only* publicly available VMM that cares about save/restore, which is that we only move forward and don't rollback.Ah, I was definitely missing this context. Current behavior makes much more sense then.quoted
Hypercalls are the least of your worries, and there is a whole range of other architectural features that will have also appeared/disappeared (your own CNTPOFF series is a glaring example of this).Isn't that a tad bit different though? I'll admit, I'm just as guilty with my own series forgetting to add a KVM_CAP (oops), but it is in my queue to kick out with the fix for nVHE/ptimer. Nonetheless, if a user takes up a new KVM UAPI, it is up to the user to run on a new kernel.
The two are linked. Exposing a new register to userspace and/or guest result in the same thing: you can't rollback. That's specially true in the QEMU case, which *learns* from the kernel what registers are available, and doesn't maintain a fixed list.
My concerns are explicitly with the 'under the nose' changes, where KVM modifies the guest feature set without userspace opting in. Based on your comment, though, it would appear that other parts of KVM are affected too.
Any new system register that is exposed by a new kernel feature breaks rollback. And so far, we only consider it a bug if the set of exposed registers reduces. Anything can be added safely (as checked by one of the selftests added by Drew). < It doesn't have to be rollback safety, either. There may
simply be a hypercall which an operator doesn't want to give its guests, and it needs a way to tell KVM to hide it.
Fair enough. But this has to be done in a scalable way, which individual capability cannot provide.
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Have I missed something blatantly obvious, or do others see this as an issue as well? I'll reply with an example of adding opt-out for PTP. I'm sure other hypercalls could be handled similarly.Why do we need this? For future hypercalls, we could have some buy-in capabilities. For existing ones, it is too late, and negative features are just too horrible.Oh, agreed on the nastiness. Lazy hack to realize the intended functional change..
Well, you definitely achieved your goal of attracting my attention :).
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For KVM-specific hypercalls, we could get the VMM to save/restore the bitmap of supported functions. That would be "less horrible". This could be implemented using extra "firmware pseudo-registers" such as the ones described in Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/psci.rst.This seems more reasonable, especially since we do this for migrating the guest's PSCI version. Alternatively, I had thought about using a VM attribute, given the fact that it is non-architectural information and we avoid ABI issues in KVM_GET_REG_LIST without buy-in through a KVM_CAP.
The whole point is that these settings get exposed by KVM_GET_REG_LIST, as this is QEMU's way to dump a VM state. Given that we already have this for things like the spectre management state, we can just as well expose the bitmaps that deal with the KVM-specific hypercalls. After all, this falls into the realm of "KVM as VM firmware". For ARM-architected hypercalls (TRNG, stolen time), we may need a similar extension. M. -- Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible. _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel