Thread (14 messages) 14 messages, 4 authors, 2021-08-04

Re: [PATCH 1/2] kasan, mm: reset tag when access metadata

From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Date: 2021-07-28 12:44:00
Also in: linux-mediatek, linux-mm, lkml

On Wed, 28 Jul 2021 at 13:05, Kuan-Ying Lee [off-list ref] wrote:
On Tue, 2021-07-27 at 20:22 +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
quoted
On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 04:32:02PM +0800, Kuan-Ying Lee wrote:
quoted
On Tue, 2021-07-27 at 09:10 +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
quoted
+Cc Catalin

On Tue, 27 Jul 2021 at 06:00, Kuan-Ying Lee <
Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com> wrote:
quoted
Hardware tag-based KASAN doesn't use compiler instrumentation,
we
can not use kasan_disable_current() to ignore tag check.

Thus, we need to reset tags when accessing metadata.

Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee <redacted>
This looks reasonable, but the patch title is not saying this is
kmemleak, nor does the description say what the problem is. What
problem did you encounter? Was it a false positive?
kmemleak would scan kernel memory to check memory leak.
When it scans on the invalid slab and dereference, the issue
will occur like below.

So I think we should reset the tag before scanning.

# echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
[  151.905804]
==================================================================
[  151.907120] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in scan_block+0x58/0x170
[  151.908773] Read at addr f7ff0000c0074eb0 by task kmemleak/138
[  151.909656] Pointer tag: [f7], memory tag: [fe]
It would be interesting to find out why the tag doesn't match.
Kmemleak
should in principle only scan valid objects that have been allocated
and
the pointer can be safely dereferenced. 0xfe is KASAN_TAG_INVALID, so
it
either goes past the size of the object (into the red zone) or it
still
accesses the object after it was marked as freed but before being
released from kmemleak.

With slab, looking at __cache_free(), it calls kasan_slab_free()
before
___cache_free() -> kmemleak_free_recursive(), so the second scenario
is
possible. With slub, however, slab_free_hook() first releases the
object
from kmemleak before poisoning it. Based on the stack dump, you are
using slub, so it may be that kmemleak goes into the object red
zones.

I'd like this clarified before blindly resetting the tag.
This kasan issue only happened on hardware tag-based kasan mode.
Because kasan_disable_current() works for generic and sw tag-based
kasan.

HW tag-based kasan depends on slub so slab will not hit this
issue.
I think we can just check if HW tag-based kasan is enabled or not
and decide to reset the tag as below.

if (kasan_has_integrated_init()) // slub case, hw-tag kasan
        pointer = *(unsigned long *)kasan_reset_tag((void *)ptr);
else
        pointer = *ptr; // slab
This is redundant. kasan_reset_tag() is a noop if
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS).
Is this better or any other suggestions?
Any suggestion is appreciated.
The current version is fine. But I think Catalin's point about why
kmemleak accesses the data in the first place still deserves some
investigation. Could it be a race between free and kmemleak scan?

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