On Mon, Jun 07, 2021 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Dave P Martin wrote:

On Thu, Jun 03, 2021 at 07:04:31PM +0100, Catalin Marinas via Libc-alpha wrote:

quoted

On Thu, Jun 03, 2021 at 05:51:34PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:

quoted

On Thu, Jun 03, 2021 at 04:40:35PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:

quoted

Do we know how libcs will detect that they don't need to do the
mprotect() calls?  Do we need a detection mechanism at all?

Ignoring certain errors from mprotect() when ld.so is trying to set
PROT_BTI on the main executable's code pages is probably a reasonable,
backwards-compatible compromise here, but it seems a bit wasteful.

I think the theory was that they would just do the mprotect() calls and
ignore any errors as they currently do, or declare that they depend on a
new enough kernel version I guess (not an option for glibc but might be
for others which didn't do BTI yet).

I think we discussed the possibility of an AT_FLAGS bit. Until recently,
this field was 0 but it gained a new bit now. If we are to expose this
to arch-specific things, it may need some reservations. Anyway, that's
an optimisation that can be added subsequently.

I suppose so, but AT_FLAGS doesn't seem appropriate somehow.

I wonder why we suddenly start considering adding a flag to AT_FLAGS
every few months, when it had sat empty for decades.  This may say
something about the current health of the kernel ABI, but I'm not sure
exactly what.

I think having mprotect() fail in a predictable way may be preferable
for now: glibc still only needs to probe with a single call and could
cache the knowledge after that.  Code outside libc / ld.so seems quite
unlikely to care about this.

I think that's the expected approach for now. If anyone complains about
an extra syscall, we can look into options but I wouldn't rush on doing
something.

Any ideas on how we would document this behaviour?  The kernel and libc
behaviour are 100% clear: you _are_ allowed to twiddle PROT_BTI on
executable mappings, and there is no legitimate (or even useful) reason
to disallow this.  It's only systemd deliberately breaking the API that
causes the behaviour seem by "userspace" to vary.

I don't think we can document all the filters that can be added on top
various syscalls, so I'd leave it undocumented (or part of the systemd
documentation). It was a user space program (systemd) breaking another
user space program (well, anything with a new enough glibc). The kernel
ABI was still valid when /sbin/init started ;).

-- 
Catalin

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