Re: [PATCHv2 0/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode PMU tracing

Sai Prakash Ranjan [off-list ref] writes:

"Consider a system where disk contents are encrypted and the encryption
key is set up by the user when mounting the file system. From that point
on the encryption key resides in the kernel. It seems reasonable to
expect that the disk encryption key be protected from exfiltration even
if the system later suffers a root compromise (or even against insiders
that have root access), at least as long as the attacker doesn't
manage to compromise the kernel."

Normally disk encryption is in specialized work queues. It's total
overkill to restrict all of the kernel if you just want to restrict
those work queues.

I would suggest some more analysis where secrets are actually stored
and handled first.

-Andi

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